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HOOP DREAMS DEFERRED: THE WNBA, THE NBA,
AND THE LONG-STANDING GENDER INEQUITY AT THE GAME’S
HIGHEST LEVEL
N. Jeremi Duru*
I. INTRODUCTION
The top three picks in the 2013 Women’s National Basketball Association
(WNBA) draft were perhaps the most talented top three picks in league history, and
they were certainly the most celebrated.1 Brittney Griner, Elena Delle Donne, and

* © 2015 N. Jeremi Duru. Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American
University. J.D., Harvard Law School; M.P.P. John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University; B.A., Brown University. I am grateful to the Honorable Damon J. Keith
for his enduring mentorship and friendship. In addition, I am grateful to Alan Milstein and
Michael McCann for inspiring this article and to Michelle Winters and Sam Burum for their
excellent research assistance.
1
In addition to their on-court exploits, each of these athletes has a unique off-court
story that captivated the basketball community as well as the nation generally.
Delle Donne, the nation’s best player when she graduated high school, committed to
play her college basketball at the University of Connecticut—arguably the nation’s best
women’s college basketball program. Within a week, though, she realized that she could not
bear to be apart from her sister who suffers from several disabilities, cannot hear or speak,
and is therefore unable to communicate by telephone. Delle Donne left Connecticut and
certain collegiate basketball stardom and moved back to her family home in Delaware, where
she eventually enrolled at the University of Delaware. She took a year off from basketball.
For fun she walked on to Delaware’s volleyball team, showing so much natural athleticism
that she became an All-American. The following year she joined Delaware’s basketball team
and embarked on her storied basketball career, launching the previously unheralded Blue
Hens on to the national stage. See Adam Himmelsbach, Happy Back Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2012, at SP1; Elena Delle Donne, WNBA, http://www.wnba.com/playerfile/elena
_delle_donne/bio.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HLG7-B27R (last visited Aug. 28,
2014).
Griner, who played for the Baylor University Bears, dominated college basketball—
dunking the ball at a rate entirely unprecedented in the women’s game—while enduring
incessant and at times malicious rumors about her sexuality. The talk never impacted
Griner’s performance and she refused to comment on it during her collegiate career. In
advance of the 2013 WNBA draft, in which she would become the first overall pick, Griner
publicly announced that she is gay. She did so in hopes of becoming a role model for youth
being bullied about their sexuality and has happily assumed that mantle as a WNBA star. See
Brittney Griner, WNBA, http://www.wnba.com/playerfile/brittney_griner/index.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/QS4E-MUBV (last visited Aug. 28, 2014); see also Brittney
Griner Discusses Being Gay, ESPN (Apr. 21, 2013, 11:34 AM),
http://espn.go.com/wnba/story/_/id/9185633/brittney-griner-comes-says-just-are, archived
at http://perma.cc/FP4T-C988.
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Skylar Diggins were phenomenal youth players, attracting attention from collegiate
coaches shortly after they began playing competitively. Delle Donne received her
first major university scholarship offer when she was in the seventh grade, and
Diggins received her first in the eighth.2 Griner did not start playing competitive
basketball until her freshman year of high school, but before long, she too was
receiving scholarship offers from major universities.3 As high-school seniors, all
three made the McDonald’s All-American team, and each was named the best highschool women’s basketball player of the year by one ranking service or another.4
Diggins grew up in South Bend, Indiana, seven miles from the University of Notre
Dame’s campus, and despite being recruited by virtually every elite women’s collegiate
basketball program in the country, she chose to stay home and help build her hometown
school into a powerhouse. See Mike Lopresti, Skylar Diggins’ Notre Dame Legacy Goes
Beyond Twitter, Final Four, USA TODAY SPORTS (Mar. 5, 2013, 9:32 PM), http://www.usa
today.com/story/sports/ncaaw/bigeast/2013/03/05/skylar-diggins-notre-dame-fighting-irish
/1965359/, archived at http://perma.cc/996D-ZV58. She did just that, bringing Notre Dame
its first two national championship appearances since 2001. Along the way, Diggins,
described by various observers as “the total package,” “truly beautiful,” “blessed with model
looks,” and “supreme attractiveness,” developed a following, by both social and traditional
media, of a scope seldom, if ever, seen for a female collegiate athlete. See Scoop Jackson,
The Skylar Diggins Balancing Act, ESPN (Dec. 24, 2011) http://espn.go.com/espn/comment
ary/story/_/page/jackson-111223/skylar-diggins-notre-dame-balances-beauty-athleticism,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y9DZ-M5B2; Sam Laird, Skylar Diggins Is the Beautiful Hoops
Star Twitter Wants to Marry, MASHABLE (Mar. 5, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/03/05/
skylar-diggins-twitter/, archived at http://perma.cc/KPY2-TMXU. She became a bona fide
celebrity, receiving amorous tweets from hip hop artist Lil’ Wayne, singer Chris Brown, and
many of her other 400,000 Twitter followers. In doing so, she popularized and marketed
women’s basketball. See Jackson, supra.
2
See Luke Cyphers, This Time It’s Different, Skylar Diggins Is Not the Next Big Thing
in Women’s Basketball. She’s the Next Big Thing, Period., ESPN THE MAG., Nov. 14, 2011,
at 102, 108 (stating that Notre Dame head coach Muffet McGraw offered Diggins a verbal
scholarship before she finished eighth grade); Jeré Longman, Walking Away, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2008, at SP1 (noting that Delle Donne received her first college scholarship offer
when she was in seventh grade).
3
Brian D. Sweany, Brittney Griner, TEX. MONTHLY (June 2010),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/brittney-griner, archived at http://perma.cc/BQ58XMPU (stating that Griner did not play basketball until her freshman year of high school,
but she quickly found that it was her best sport).
4
Delle Donne graduated from high school in 2008, a year before Diggins and Griner,
and as a senior she was named USA Today High School Basketball Player of the Year,
Naismith Prep Player of the Year, and EA Sports Player of the Year. NCAAW Profile: Elena
Delle Donne, SHE’S A BALLER, http://www.shesaballer.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=194:ncaaw-profile-elena-delle-donne&catid=43:nvaaw-profiles,
archived at http://perma.cc/EM7A-RY7U (last visited May. 28, 2015). The following year,
Diggins was named Naismith Prep Player of the Year and Gatorade High School Player of
the Year, NCAA Player Profile: Skylar Diggins, SHE’S A BALLER,
http://www.shesaballer.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93:ncaaplayer-profile-skylar-diggins&catid=43:nvaaw-profiles, archived at http://perma.cc/JF74-
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Griner, Delle Donne, and Diggins could almost certainly have competed in the
WNBA straight out of high school, and after their first collegiate seasons—during
which Griner led the nation in blocked shots, Delle Donne was fourth in the nation
in scoring, and Diggins led her team in scoring, steals, and assists—each was clearly
WNBA ready.5
Male collegiate basketball players are eligible to declare for the draft in the
WNBA’s brother league, the National Basketball Association (NBA), after their
freshman year (or when they are one year removed from high school), and many of
Griner’s, Delle Donne’s, and Diggins’ fellow rising sophomores did just that.6
Griner, Delle Donne, and Diggins did not, however, have the option to launch their
professional careers then, because female collegiate basketball players are not
eligible to enter the WNBA until after their senior year (or when they are four years
removed from high school).7

6WTP (last visited Sept. 27, 2014), and Griner was named USA Today High School
Basketball Player of the Year and Women’s Basketball Coaches Association (WBCA) High
School Player of the Year, Brittney Griner, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF USA BASKETBALL (Oct.
7, 2013), http://archive.usab.com/bios/griner_brittney.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K59
-L3WY.
5
About Elena, ELENADELLEDONNE.COM, http://elenadelledonne.com/#about, archived
at http://perma.cc/G624-P6CP (last visited Jan. 5, 2015); Baylor’s Brittney Griner Sets
NCAA Mark for Blocked Shots, ABC13.COM (Jan. 27, 2013, 2:17 AM),
http://abc13.com/archive/8969594, archived at http://perma.cc/47NS-7SMX; Skylar
Diggins, UND.COM, http://www.und.com/sports/w-baskbl/mtt/diggins_skylar00.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/MRF8-3CPJ (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
6
A complete list of male collegiate players who declared for the NBA draft after their
freshman year in 2010, the year in which Delle Donne, Diggins, and Griner became
sophomores, follows: Al-Farouq Aminu, Eric Bledsoe, Avery Bradley, DeMarcus Cousins,
Derrick Favors, Keith Gallon, Xavier Henry, Tommy Mason-Griffin, Daniel Orton, Lance
Stephenson, John Wall, and Hassan Whiteside. 2010 NBA Draft Results Round 1, ESPN
NBA DRAFTTRACKER, http://insider.espn.go.com/nbadraft/results/rounds/_/year/2010/
round/1, archived at http://perma.cc/ZQ8X-NNKU (last visited Sept. 27, 2014); 2010 NBA
Draft Results Round 2, ESPN NBA DRAFTTRACKER, http://insider.espn.go.com/nbadraft/
results/rounds/_/year/2010/round/2, archived at http://perma.cc/P245-AG25 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2014).
7
The WNBA’s age eligibility rule is housed in Article XIII of the WNBA Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and reads, in relevant part, as follows:
(b) A player is eligible to be selected in the WNBA Draft if she: (i) will be at
least twenty-two (22) years old during the calendar year in which such Draft is
held and she . . . has no remaining intercollegiate eligibility . . . (ii) has graduated
from a four-year college or university prior to such Draft, or “is to graduate”
from such college or university within the three (3)-month period following such
Draft . . . or (iii) attended a four-year college or university, her original class in
such college or university has already been graduated or “is to graduate” within
the three (3)-month period following such Draft . . . .
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Were the NBA and WNBA distinct, unaffiliated organizations, their disparate
age eligibility rules would be an unfortunate but unactionable gender-based reality.
However, in that the NBA founded the WNBA as a subsidiary corporation, has long
funded the WNBA, instituted the WNBA’s age eligibility rule, and has generally
exercised control over the WNBA throughout the majority of the WNBA’s
existence, the disparate age eligibility rules raise sex-discrimination concerns. This
paper explores these concerns and concludes that, because of the NBA’s
involvement in and dominance over the WNBA, the NBA is potentially liable for
Title VII sex discrimination caused by the WNBA’s age eligibility rule.
Part II of this Article explores age eligibility rules in American professional
sports generally. It then turns its focus to the close relationship between the NBA
and the WNBA, particularly those two leagues’ age eligibility rules, how they came
to be, and the inequity between them. Part III examines the impact of the inequitable
age eligibility thresholds, with respect to both risk of injury and lost compensation,
on female basketball players. Part IV addresses the three most commonly asserted
justifications for the WNBA’s age eligibility rule—(1) that WNBA players should
be scholars and role models; (2) that the age eligibility rule reduces the likelihood
of poor financial outcomes for WNBA players, and (3) that the age eligibility rule
strengthens the WNBA—and argues that none of them justifies that the WNBA’s
rule is more stringent than the NBA’s rule. Part V argues that the NBA, by virtue of
being the WNBA’s parent company, is responsible for this inequity and the effects
that flow therefrom. Part VI explores Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
subjects the inequity between the NBA’s age eligibility rule and the WNBA’s age
eligibility rule to Title VII analysis, ultimately arguing the inequity violates Title
VII. Finally, Part VII concludes that the NBA, in light of its relationship with the
WNBA, may be liable for this Title VII violation.
II. AGE ELIGIBILITY RULES IN AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Age eligibility rules in American professional sports have long triggered
substantial debate.8 Many sports leagues and associations, such as Major League

WOMAN’S NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XIII
§ 1, at 105 (2014) [hereinafter WNBA CBA], available at http://wnbpa-uploads.s3.amazon
aws.com/docs/WNBA%20CBA%202014-2021Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/44U8FSZE. An exception to this rule applies to international players, which the CBA defines as
players “born and residing outside the United States.” Id. An international player “is eligible
to be selected in the WNBA Draft if she will be at least 20 years old during the calendar year
in which such Draft is held.” Id.
8
See, e.g., Christian Dennie, From Clarett to Mayo: The Antitrust Labor Exemption
Argument Continues, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 63 (2007); Michael A. McCann, Illegal
Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 3
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113 (2004); Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of
Age Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731 (2006); Andrew M.
Jones, Comment, Hold the Mayo: An Analysis of the Validity of the NBA’s Stern No Preps
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Soccer, the Professional Golfers’ Association, and the Ladies Professional Golfers’
Association have no age eligibility rules at all.9 Others, like Major League Baseball
(MLB), the Association of Tennis Professionals, and the Women’s Tennis
Association, have age eligibility rules set well below the age of majority.10 The
National Hockey League (NHL) requires entrants achieve nineteen years of age, the
NBA requires entrants be one year removed from high school, and the National
Football League (NFL) requires entrants be three years removed from high school.11

to Pros Rule and the Application of the Nonstatutory Exemption, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
475 (2006); David G. Kabbes, Note, Professional Sports’ Eligibility Rules: Too Many
Players on the Field, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233 (1986); Joseph A. Litman, Note, Tremendous
Upside Potential: How A High-School Basketball Player Might Challenge the National
Basketball Association’s Eligibility Requirements, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 261 (2010); Jack
N.E. Pitts, Jr., Comment, Why Wait?: An Antitrust Analysis of the National Football League
and National Basketball Association’s Draft Eligibility Rules, 51 HOW. L.J. 433 (2008).
9
See McCann & Rosen, supra note 8, at 731 (“The NFL and the NBA are the only
major sports organizations that prohibit players from entrance until a prescribed period after
high school graduation.”); Jenna Merten, Comment, Raising a Red Card: Why Freddy Adu
Should Not Be Allowed to Play Professional Soccer, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 218
(2004) (arguing that MLS should enact an age eligibility rule rather than maintain its current
model).
10
Major League Baseball’s First-Year Player Draft eligibility is limited to (1) “High
school players, if they have graduated from high school and have not yet attended college or
junior college;” (2) “College players, from four-year colleges who have either completed
their junior or senior years or are at least 21 years old;” and (3) “Junior college players,
regardless of how many years of school they have completed.” First-Year Player Draft,
Official Rules, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp, archived at
http://perma.cc/CBQ-79DU (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
Male and female tennis players cannot play professional tournaments or in international
tennis competitions until they are fourteen years old. ASS’N OF TENNIS PROF’LS, 2015 ATP
OFFICIAL RULEBOOK § 7.02(A)(1) (2015), available at http://www.atpworldtour.com/Corpo
rate/Rulebook.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/B4JA-TDZC (“Male players under the age
of fourteen (14) shall not be eligible for entry into any ATP World Tour or ATP Challenger
Tour tournament.”); WOMEN’S TENNIS ASS’N, 2015 WTA OFFICIAL RULEBOOK §
XV(A)(2)(a)(i)
(2015),
available
at
http://www.wtatennis.com/SEWTATourArchive/Archive/AboutTheTour/rules2015.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L2AC-MATG
(“A player who has not yet reached the date of her 14th birthday may not participate in any
Professional Tennis Tournament on the WTA or ITF Women’s Circuit, or in any level of
Fed Cup competition.”).
11
See NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
art. X § 1(b)(i) (2011) [hereinafter NBA CBA, Article X], available at
http://mediacentral.nba.com/media/mediacentral/2011-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H8H3-M2MD (“The player (A) is or will be at least 19
years of age during the calendar year in which the Draft is held, and (B) with respect to a
player who is not an international player . . . , at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed since
the player’s graduation from high school (or, if the player did not graduate from high school,
since the graduation of the class with which the player would have graduated had he
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The WNBA’s rule, requiring entrants be four years removed from high school, is
the most stringent in the nation.12
Critics have noted the differences among the age eligibility rules adopted by
various leagues and questioned why those differences exist.13 Why, for instance,
should MLB have a more forgiving age eligibility rule than the NFL? If the reason
is football is more physically demanding and dangerous than baseball and therefore
requires that entrants be more physically mature, why should the NHL—which, like
the NFL, is extremely physically demanding—also have a more forgiving age
eligibility rule than the NFL?
Some critics have attributed the differences to race, noting the sports African
Americans numerically dominate—football and basketball—have higher barriers to
entry than, for instance baseball, tennis, and golf, in which African Americans are

graduated from high school)”); NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT art. 6 § 2(b) (2011), available at https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media
/Default/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/WZ2H-TSB3 (“No player shall be permitted to apply for special eligibility
for selection in the Draft, or otherwise be eligible for the Draft, until three NFL regular
seasons have begun and ended following either his graduation from high school or graduation
of the class with which he entered high school, whichever is earlier.”); Hockey Operations
Guidelines, NHL.COM, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26377, archived at
http://perma.cc/RP8V-84DJ (last visited Aug. 28, 2014) (“All players age 19 or older . . . are
eligible for claim in the Entry Draft . . . .”).
12
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13
See, e.g., Michael Brogin, The NBA Draft and The Ongoing Eligibility Debate,
BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 15, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/378812-the-nba-draftand-the-ongoing-eligiblity-debate, archived at http://perma.cc/8LME-ENDF (comparing the
NBA, MLB, NHL, and NFL age eligibility rules); Grant Hughes, Why the NBA’s 1-andDone Rule Is Causing More Harm than Good, BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1723163-why-the-nbas-one-and-done-rule-is-causingmore-harm-than-good, archived at http://perma.cc/5CM-83Z6 (arguing that MLB’s policy
allowing 18-year-old players either to jump straight to the professional ranks or to go to
college for three years is a better alternative); Matt Norlander, Pac-12 Commish Larry Scott
Wants Change to NBA Age-Limit Rule, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 2, 2013, 9:53 AM),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/eye-on-college-basketball/22986969/pac12commish-larry-scott-wants-change-to-nba-agelimit-rule, archived at http://perma.cc/7JYJ5YB (arguing the NFL has not suffered from a higher age limit).
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more scarce.14 Others have not alleged discriminatory motives, but have derided the
differences as unfair nonetheless.15
Despite the WNBA’s age eligibility rule being the most stringent in the land,
the great bulk of the criticism and all of the lawsuits regarding professional sports
leagues’ age eligibility thresholds have dealt with men’s sport.16 Professors Marc
Edelman and C. Keith Harrison, in their 2008 article, Analyzing the WNBA’s
Mandatory Age/Education Policy from a Legal, Cultural, and Ethical Perspective:
Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape, were the first to launch a
serious and scholarly challenge to the WNBA’s age eligibility rule.17 Their article
explores the rule’s “ethicality”—questioning why “male basketball players are
allowed to enter the NBA only one year after graduating from high school, whereas
female basketball players have to wait four years before entering the WNBA”—and
then explores the rule’s legality under antitrust principles.18 In doing so, Harrison
and Edelman offer a thorough analysis of the cases that have molded the antitrust
legal landscape in sport, including Mackey v. National Football League,19 Clarett v.
National Football League,20 and Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.21
Harrison and Edelman conclude that because of the “inconsistencies in the case law,

14

See TODD BOYD, YOUNG, BLACK, RICH AND FAMOUS: THE RISE OF THE NBA, THE
HIP HOP INVASION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 177 (2003) (arguing
that while camouflaging the problem as an age issue, in reality people are concerned the
league is “too Black”); Stern Wants NBA Age Limit Raised to 20, ESPN (Apr. 13, 2005, 9:38
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2035132, archived at http://perma.cc/H6
JG-6ASU (quoting Jermaine O’Neal as saying “[a]s a black guy, you kind of think [race is]
the reason why it’s coming up. You don’t hear about it in baseball or hockey,” when asked
about NBA Commissioner David Stern’s suggestion that the age limit be raised (alteration
in original)).
15
See, e.g., Jonathan Tjarks, Why the NBA Age Limit Is Unfair and Why It Should Be
Extended, BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/488970-whythe-nba-age-limit-is-unfair-and-why-it-should-be-extended, archived at http://perma.cc/CW
96-KQ8T; Cohen Calls Age Limit ‘Unfair’, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 3, 2009, 9:35PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=4229043, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3YPRRTE.
16
Excluded players have brought suit against the NBA and NFL for their leagues’ age
eligibility rules. See, e.g., Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004);
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., No. 71-1089, 1971 WL 3015 (9th Cir. Feb. 16,
1971), rev’d sub nom. In re Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
17
Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA’s Mandatory
Age/Education Policy from a Legal, Cultural, and Ethical Perspective: Women, Men, and
the Professional Sports Landscape, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1 (2008).
18
Id. at 2.
19
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
20
369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
21
No. 71-1089, 1971 WL 3015 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1971), rev’d sub nom. In re Haywood
v. Nat'l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
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it is impossible to predict with certainty whether a court would find the WNBA
age/education policy to be illegal” under antitrust law.22
Like the Harrison-Edelman article, this article explores the rule’s “ethicality”—
the higher age barrier to entry for female basketball players than male basketball
players—but rather than view the problem through an antitrust lens, as age eligibility
rules are generally viewed, this article views it as a discrimination issue to be
addressed with America’s most impactful and far-reaching anti-discrimination
statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
A. The NBA and Its Age Eligibility Rule
In order to understand the WNBA’s age eligibility rule, one must understand
the NBA’s basic history, its age eligibility rule, and how that rule came to be.
The NBA began operations in New York City in 1946 as the Basketball
Association of America.23 Three years later, after merging with the National
Basketball League in 1949, the NBA took its current name.24 After struggling
initially and contracting from seventeen teams to eight teams in its first few years in
existence, the league began to gain steam, taking root as the preeminent professional
basketball league in the United States.25 The NBA grew further in prominence
through the 1960s, and in the 1970s it endured a challenge from the upstart American
Basketball Association (ABA), ultimately absorbing four of the ABA’s teams.26 The
NBA’s preeminence has not been challenged since. The league is now thirty teams
strong and stands as one of America’s most notable and well-recognized sports
leagues.27
Age eligibility rules have for years been a controversial aspect of the NBA’s
regulatory framework. At its founding, the NBA had no age eligibility restrictions,
and although over the league’s early years a few players entered the league without
playing college basketball, playing four years in college before turning professional
was the norm.28 Before long, though, the NBA established a rule stating that “‘a

22

Edelman & Harrison, supra note 17, at 18.
Leonard Koppett, The NBA, 1946: A New League, in THE OFFICIAL NBA
ENCYCLOPEDIA 38, 39 (3d ed. 2000).
24
Id. at 41 (discussing the merger of the BAA and the NBL, as well as the name
change).
25
See id. at 4041.
26
See John Hareas, Coast to Coast: The NBA Expands, in THE OFFICIAL NBA
ENCYCLOPEDIA 72, 72–73 (3d ed. 2000).
27
Teams, NBA, http://www.nba.com/teams/, archived at http://perma.cc/C38Z-PCK7
(last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
28
It is unclear when the four-year age requirement began. “The original NBA
age/education requirement dates back at least as far as 1969, and possibly as far as the
league’s inception . . . .” Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained
Age/Education Requirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor
23
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player could not make himself available’ for the NBA draft until four years after his
high school graduation,”29 and because no player could sign with an NBA team until
he was eligible for at least one draft, the rule created an across-the-board barrier to
NBA entry.30
In 1970, however, Spencer Haywood brought a suit challenging the rule.31 After
two years of college basketball (one at a junior college), Haywood left college for
the ABA, which, unlike the NBA, had no rule prohibiting early entrants.32 Haywood
had a sensational season with the ABA’s Denver Rockets,33 averaging 30 points and
19.5 rebounds per game and winning the league’s Rookie of the Year and MVP
awards.34 After the season, Haywood left the Rockets and signed a contract to play
the following season with the NBA’s Seattle SuperSonics.35 Because Haywood was
only three years out of high school, however, the contract violated the NBA’s age
eligibility rule, and the NBA voided it.36 In response, Haywood filed an antitrust
action against the league in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California seeking an injunction to stop the NBA from disallowing the contract.37
Haywood characterized the NBA’s conduct as a “group boycott” that restrained
trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the district court agreed, finding

Risk for Players Unions?, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 354 (2010) (citing Leonard Koppett,
Legal Factors Hamper N.B.A. – A.B.A. Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1971, at 50).
29
Warren K. Zola, Transitioning to the NBA: Advocating on Behalf of Student-Athletes
for NBA & NCAA Rule Changes, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 159, 168 (2012) (citing John
C. Graves, Controlling Athletes with the Draft and Salary Cap: Are Both Necessary?, 5
SPORTS L. J. 185, 187 (1998)).
30
See NBA CBA, Article X, supra note 11, § 1(a).
31
SHELDON GALLNER, PRO SPORTS: THE CONTRACT GAME 18 (1974).
32
Id. at 18–19; see also David Friedman, Chocolate Thunder and Short Shorts: The
NBA in the 1970s, in BASKETBALL IN AMERICA: FROM THE PLAYGROUNDS TO JORDAN’S
GAME AND BEYOND 189, 197 (Bob Batchelor ed., 2005) (“Haywood had played only one
year of junior college ball and one year at the University of Detroit before he joined the
ABA’s Denver Rockets for the 1969-1970 season. . . . The ABA subsequently signed
numerous underclassmen . . . .”).
33
Friedman, supra note 32, at 197. When the Denver franchise was absorbed into the
NBA in 1974, the team became the Denver Nuggets. See John Gardella, Red, White & Blue:
The Colorful ABA, in THE OFFICIAL NBA ENCYCLOPEDIA 62, 63 (3d ed. 2000) (listing the
teams affected by the acquisition of the ABA).
34
Friedman, supra note 32, at 197; see also GALLNER, supra note 31, at 20 (alluding to
Haywood’s extremely successful performance in the ABA).
35
GALLNER, supra note 31, at 18–19.
36
Id. at 19. The NBA Commissioner at the time, Walter Kennedy, was tasked under
the NBA bylaws with approving each player’s contract, but he refused to approve
Haywood’s. Id.
37
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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in Haywood’s favor.38 A tortured procedural history, including appeals both by the
NBA and Haywood, followed, but the district court’s resolution ultimately stood.39
In the decision’s wake, the NBA had little choice but to alter its age eligibility
rule. The league articulated the view, however, that college provided NBA aspirants
with valuable “life experience,”40 so it cabined its alteration, allowing a player to
leave college early to enter the NBA only if he could prove “severe economic
hardship.”41 Before long, though, the exception swallowed the rule, and, as Sport
magazine writer Jackie Lapin put it, by the mid-1970s, “almost anyone . . . would
qualify [as a hardship case].”42 Within five years, the NBA abandoned what had
come to be known as the “easyship”43 rule and instituted a new early entry process
which declared the NBA draft “open to any person whose high school class has
graduated so long as he renounces his college basketball eligibility, in writing, 45
days before the draft.”44
With each passing year, more and more college underclassmen—and
occasionally, a player straight out of high school—entered the NBA, and while many
washed out, many others went on to have outstanding careers.45 Indeed, when the
NBA in 1996 announced its list of the 50 Greatest NBA Players in History, the list
included eleven players who entered the league right after high-school graduation.46
In the same year, Kobe Bryant, following in the footsteps of Kevin Garnett one year
earlier, left high school directly for the NBA.47 Bryant and Garnett quickly became

38

Id. at 1056.
In re Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1206 (1971), reinstating
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
40
Susan McAleavey, Note, Spendthrift Trust: An Alternative to the NBA Age Rule, 84
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 279, 284 (2010) (citing Michael A. McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of
Dominion: A Situational Analysis of the NBA and Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 819, 832–33 (2006)).
41
Id. at 283 (citing Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of
Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 113, 218
(2004)).
42
Friedman, supra note 32, at 199.
43
GALLNER, supra note 31, at 18–26.
44
Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis of the Legality of
Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen from Entering Professional
Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 539, 553 (1998).
45
See BOYD, supra note 14, at 175–76 (documenting the trend of underclassman and
high school students leaving for the NBA); Jones, supra note 8, at 478–79 (stating that NBA
rosters began to include many players drafted straight from high school in the years after
high school phenomenon Kevin Garnett was drafted in 1995).
46
The NBA at 50, NBA, www.nba.com/history/players/50greatest.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/J5AM-N9YA (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (including early entrants Charles
Barkley, Clyde Drexler, Julius Erving, George Gervin, Magic Johnson, Michael Jordan,
Moses Malone, Hakeem Olajuwon, Shaquille O'Neal, Isiah Thomas, and James Worthy
among the fifty greatest players in NBA history).
47
See Kobe Bryant, NBA, http://www.nba.com/playerfile/kobe_bryant/bio/?ls=iref:
39
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two of the best players in the league, which prompted a trend through the rest of the
1990s and into the early 2000s of the nation’s best players, such as Tracy McGrady,
Amar’e Stoudemire, LeBron James, and Dwight Howard, skipping college
altogether.48
This influx of high schoolers caused tremendous controversy, and arguments
flew in both directions.49 Boiled down, opponents of the trend argued that players
entering the league out of high school were disproportionately fundamentally
unsound and were insufficiently mature to handle playing in the NBA, and some
worried these young players would flounder in life with no education to fall back on
if they proved ill-prepared for the NBA.50 Those who embraced the trend, on the
other hand, believed the decision to declare for the NBA draft out of high school to
be a personal choice and noted that many NBA aspirants are not academically
prepared for college and that lack of college preparation should not unhinge their
professional goals.51
Ultimately, the league and union agreed in 2005 through the Collective
Bargaining Agreement to implement the age eligibility rule that remains in force
today, essentially requiring that NBA aspirants be at least one year removed from
high school before entering the NBA.52 The rule, colloquially known as the “one and
playerCompleteBioLink, archived at http://perma.cc/SU43-3L4J (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
48
See e.g., Logic Johnson, LeBron James and the 10 Greatest Players Drafted Out of
High School, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 10, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1136047lebron-james-and-the-10-greatest-players-drafted-out-of-high-school,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/95T3-SR7V; Ryan Pratt, NBA Basketball Players Straight from High School,
LIST AFTER LIST (Mar. 3, 2014), http://listafterlist.com/nba-basketball-players-straightfrom-high-school, archived at http://perma.cc/B7D7-494C.
49
See generally Brian Shaffer, Comment, The NBA’s Age Requirement Shoots and
Misses: How the Non-Statutory Exemption Produces Inequitable Results for High School
Basketball Stars, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681, 684–99 (2008) (outlining the arguments for
and against the NBA’s age eligibility rule).
50
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 8, at 476 (recording former NBA Commissioner David
Stern’s concerns with young players who “never made it in the NBA, lost out on a free
college education, and were out of work in their desired profession by their early twenties”);
Steve Kerr, The Case for the 20-Year-Old Age Limit in the NBA, GRANTLAND (May 8, 2012),
http://www.grantland.com/features/steve-kerr-problems-age-limit-nba/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/S24C-3SWZ (arguing that many young players struggle initially “as they
adjust to the workload, schedule, travel, stress, and media scrutiny” in the NBA).
51
See Kevin J. Cimino, Comment, The Rebirth of the NBA—Well, Almost: An Analysis
of the Maurice Clarett Decision and Its Impact on the National Basketball Association, 108
W. VA. L. REV. 831, 861–64 (2006) (focusing on the financial ramifications of the age
eligibility rules); Jones, supra note 8, at 479 (commenting that even former NBA
Commissioner David Stern initially commented, “it’s for [players] and their parents to make
the decision rather than all of us sanctimoniously and piously making these judgments”)
(citing Selena Roberts, Stern Questions the Outrage Over Early Entry to N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 1996, at C8).
52
See NBA CBA, Article X, § 1(b), supra note 11. The text of the provision follows:
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done” rule,53 is controversial for many of the same reasons the former “none and
done rule” was controversial. Opponents, however, expressed an additional concern:
that the rule alteration was senseless and accomplished nothing; that many players
drop out of school after the basketball season to train for the NBA and even those
who stay the full year cannot be viewed as college educated or otherwise materially
better prepared for the NBA than high-school seniors would be.54

(b) A player shall be eligible for selection in the first NBA Draft with respect to
which he has satisfied all applicable requirements of Section 1(b)(i) below and
one of the requirements of Section 1(b)(ii) below: (i) The player (A) is or will be
at least 19 years of age during the calendar year in which the Draft is held, and
(B) with respect to a player who is not an international player (defined below),
at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed since the player’s graduation from high
school (or, if the player did not graduate from high school, since the graduation
of the class with which the player would have graduated had he graduated from
high school); and (ii)(A) The player has graduated from a four-year college or
university in the United States (or is to graduate in the calendar year in which the
Draft is held) and has no remaining intercollegiate basketball eligibility; or (B)
The player is attending or previously attended a four-year college or university
in the United States, his original class in such college or university has graduated
(or is to graduate in the calendar year in which the Draft is held), and he has no
remaining intercollegiate basketball eligibility; or (C) The player has graduated
from high school in the United States, did not enroll in a four-year college or
university in the United States, and four calendar years have elapsed since such
player’s high school graduation; or (D) The player did not graduate from high
school in the United States, and four calendar years have elapsed since the
graduation of the class with which the player would have graduated had he
graduated from high school; or (E) The player has signed a player contract with
a “professional basketball team not in the NBA” (defined below) that is located
anywhere in the world, and has rendered services under such contract prior to
the Draft; or (F) The player has expressed his desire to be selected in the Draft
in a writing received by the NBA at least sixty (60) days prior to such Draft (an
“Early Entry” player) . . . .
53
E.g., Kelly Dwyer, David Stern Absolutely Eviscerates NCAA Over ‘One and Done’
Rule, YAHOO! SPORTS (Mar. 28, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nba-balldont-lie/david-stern-absolutely-eviscerates-ncaa-over-one-done-150142445.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/C267-EL56 (commenting on the tension between the NCAA and NBA
over the “one and done” rule); Jarrad Saffren, NCAA Basketball: The All One and Done
Team, BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 26, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1041072-ncaabasketball-the-all-one-and-done-team,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/VSX7-5SB5
(highlighting some of the best college basketball players who left for the NBA after their
freshman year).
54
John Feinstein, John Feinstein Blog: One-and-Done College Basketball Players
Aren’t ‘Student-Athletes,’ JOHN FEINSTEIN BLOG (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:07 PM),
http://feinstein.radio.cbssports.com/2013/10/16/john-feinstein-blog-one-and-done-collegebasketball-players-arent-student-athletes/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y53V-5X9C (finding
the NCAA is simply “housing NBA players for a year” because the athletes do not want to
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Since 2005, there have been numerous calls to alter or eliminate the rule, but to
date no change has been made.55
B. The NBA, the WNBA, and the WNBA’s Age Eligibility Rule
In 1996, the U.S. Women’s Basketball team won the Olympic gold medal.56
The United States had won Olympic gold medals in women’s basketball previously,
but this victory seemed special. One reason is the Olympics were played in the
United States (Atlanta, Georgia), but in addition, as the Games were being played
there was an unprecedented excitement around the women’s team and women’s
basketball in general.57 In 1972, Congress had enacted Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which prevents sex discrimination in education and which
came to have a substantial impact in high school and collegiate athletics.58 By 1996,
an entire generation of women had grown up under Title IX and with generally more
opportunities to play and female athletes to emulate than their predecessors.59 All of
women’s sport was benefitting from Title IX, and basketball was no exception.60
The collegiate game was more exciting than ever, and bona fide superstars, such as
Texas Tech’s recently graduated Sheryl Swoopes—whose play inspired Nike to
produce the Air Swoopes women’s basketball shoe and campaign in the mold of its
iconic Air Jordan brand—were bursting onto the national stage.61

be there and are not going to bother with classes at all after their first semester in college);
cf. Andy Clayton, Ohio State’s Third-String QB Cardale Jones Tweets That Classes Are
‘Pointless’ . . . Saying He Went to College to Play Football, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 6, 2012,
1:11 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/college/ohio-state-player-tweets-classespointless-article-1.1176616#ixzz2luI2rS6i, archived at http://perma.cc/ZYG9-6CNX
(reporting that Ohio State quarterback Cardale Jones tweeted, “Why should we have to go to
class if we came here to play FOOTBALL, we ain’t come to play SCHOOL classes are
POINTLESS”).
55
See, e.g., McCann & Rosen, supra note 8, at 731–32.
56
Lisa A. Ennis, Crashing the Boards: The WNBA and the Evolution of an Image, in
BASKETBALL IN AMERICA: FROM THE PLAYGROUNDS TO JORDAN’S GAME AND BEYOND 231,
233 (Bob Batchelor ed., 2005).
57
See id. at 234 (stating that more than 30,000 fans attended each of the team’s six
games).
58
Id. at 231–32.
59
See Kate Fagan, More than a Dream, ESPNW (June 19, 2012),
espn.go.com/espnw/title-ix/article/8068496/more-dream, archived at http://perma.cc/HW
7N-T3DR (asserting that the Atlanta Olympic Games are often called the “‘Title IX
Olympics . . . because so many of the female athletes competing [in the Games] grew up
after the law, passed in 1972, had taken root”).
60
See id. (noting that Title IX positively affected all women’s sports).
61
See SANDRA STEEN & SUSAN STEEN, TAKE IT TO THE HOOP 111 (2003) (detailing
Sheryl Swoopes’ shoe deal with Nike); Nine for IX: Swoopes (ESPN television broadcast
July 30, 2013).
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As the national team prepared for the tournament, the nation began to embrace
the team, but in addition to being a phenomenon, the team’s participation in the
Olympic Games presented “a business opportunity . . . not lost on the NBA.”62 As
the WNBA’s first President Val Ackerman has explained, “there was incredible
anticipation about this particular team and what it would be able to do on the court,
and the sort of hidden story . . . was that the NBA was quietly using the team as a
way to test interest for the start of the WNBA.”63 Former NBA Commissioner David
Stern admitted as much: “It was a huge opportunity, because I felt that tapping into
the other half of the population, even though it would take some time, would open
up a whole new area for basketball.”64
Ultimately, the NBA liked what it saw and seized upon the “huge opportunity”
Commissioner Stern had identified. On April 24, 1996, Stern and the NBA Board of
Governors granted approval for the WNBA to exist, and during the summer of 1997,
the NBA launched the WNBA.65 The league’s eight charter teams—Charlotte Sting,
Cleveland Rockers, Houston Comets, New York Liberty, Los Angeles Sparks,
Phoenix Mercury, Sacramento Monarchs, and Utah Starzz—were each based in a
city with an NBA team and were each directly owned by the NBA, which ultimately
controlled the WNBA as a single entity.66
The NBA did not obfuscate its ownership of the WNBA. To the contrary, it
emphasized it. Anybody who watched a WNBA game, saw a WNBA advertisement,
or paid even the slightest attention to the WNBA would know instantly that the
upstart league was of the NBA. Most obviously, the WNBA’s name—the Women’s
National Basketball Association—made the connection clear. Further, the WNBA’s
logo at inception was a virtual mirror image of the NBA’s logo (the only material
differences being that the basketball playing figure in the WNBA’s logo was
anatomically adjusted and sported longer hair) and each WNBA team adopted the
colors of the NBA team in its city.67 In addition, most WNBA teams used names
directly related to the NBA team in its city: Charlotte Sting (WNBA) / Charlotte
Hornets (NBA); Houston Comets (WNBA) / Houston Rockets (NBA); Phoenix
Mercury (WNBA) / Phoenix Suns (NBA); Sacramento Monarchs (WNBA) /
Sacramento Kings (NBA); Utah Starzz (WNBA) / Utah Jazz (NBA).

62
Nine for IX: Swoopes, supra note 61; see also Ennis, supra note 56, at 231–32
(“riding the momentum . . . of the 1996 Dream Team’s popularity”).
63
Nine for IX: Swoopes, supra note 61.
64
Id.
65
Jeanne Tang, The WNBA: A League of Their Own, in THE OFFICIAL NBA
ENCYCLOPEDIA 306, 306–07 (Jan Hubbard ed., 3d ed. 2000).
66
Id. at 308; Lacie L. Kaiser, Comment, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Sport
Leagues, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (2004).
67
STEEN & STEEN, supra note 61, at 110. In 2013, the WNBA changed its logo from
one that mirrored the NBA’s red, white, and blue logo to one that is orange and white. Ben
Chodos, WNBA Reveals New Logo Featuring Mystery Silhouette, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 28,
2013),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1585145-wnba-reveals-new-logo-featuringmystery-silhouette, archived at http://perma.cc/TVX3-DT7J.
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Indeed, being a part of the NBA clearly saved the WNBA from being drummed
out of existence in its infancy by a rival league.68 Commissioner Stern and his NBA
colleagues were not the only people to see the potential of women’s professional
basketball in the mid-1990s. American Basketball League (ABL) founders Gary
Cavalli, Steve Hams, Anne Cribbs, and Bobby Johnson69 saw it as well, and when
the WNBA began play in the summer of 1997, the ABL, which had franchises in
eight cities, had already completed its inaugural season.70
The ABL was packed with talent. Nine members of the United States Olympic
Women’s Basketball team and forty-three former All-American collegians graced
the ABL’s teams’ rosters, and the league featured an extremely high level of play.71
The WNBA entered the women’s basketball market with generally less renowned
and less skilled players than the ABL and paid, on average, far lower salaries.72 Still,
it was clear almost from the beginning that because of the NBA’s heft, the ABL
stood little chance of surviving.
The WNBA’s teams played in large premier venues in which NBA teams
played, secured sponsorship marketing deals—through the NBA—with premier
corporate entities, such as Nike, Coca-Cola, General Motors, American Express,
Sears, and Spalding, and landed television contracts with NBC, ESPN, and
Lifetime.73 The ABL suddenly seemed like a minor league, and before long, the
ABL’s best players were migrating to the WNBA. Before the ABL’s second season,
the WNBA signed the ABL’s top player, Nikki McCray, to a contract for less money
but far more promotional opportunity than she was getting with the ABL, and other

68

See PAMELA GRUNDY & SUSAN SHACKELFORD, SHATTERING THE GLASS: THE
REMARKABLE HISTORY OF WOMEN’S BASKETBALL 228–29 (2005) (citing the NBA’s
prominence as one factor in the WNBA’s success).
69
American Basketball League, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 6, 1996, 12:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/sports/american-basketball-league-article-1.738073,
archived at http://perma.cc/R5G7-UJZF.
70
STEEN & STEEN, supra note 61, at 98 (stating the ABL’s inaugural game was held on
October 18, 1996).
71
See Edelman & Harrison, supra note 17, at 6 & n.42.
72
See id. at 7 (contrasting the WNBA model from that of the ABL because the WNBA
initially implemented a league-wide salary cap on all players’ contracts at $50,000); Rachel
Schaffer, Grabbing Them by the Balls: Legislatures, Courts, and Team Owners Bar NonElite Professional Athletes from Workers’ Compensation, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 623, 631–32 (2000) (finding ABL contracts were significantly higher than WNBA
contracts).
73
Ennis, supra note 56, at 235; TANG, supra note 65, at 307; Jean Halliday, GM to
Sponsor Women’s Basketball: Carmaker Backs WNBA; Also Ties to Sony Complex, ADAGE
(Mar. 24, 1997), http://adage.com/article/news/gm-sponsor-women-s-basketball-carmakerbacks-wnba-ties-sony-complex/73201/, archived at http://perma.cc/VEA3-6RWW; Jennifer
Lee, AmEx Adds to WNBA Sponsor Deal, SPORTS BUS. DAILY (July 16, 2001),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2001/07/20010716/This-Weeks-Issue/
Amex-Adds-To-WNBA-Sponsor-Deal.aspx?hl=National&sc=0, archived at http://perma.
cc/4UZQ-WG2T.
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marquee players quickly followed.74 By 1998, the ABL was financially insolvent,
and on December 22 of that year, in the middle of its third season, the ABL filed for
bankruptcy.75
The ABL, of course, played a role in its own demise. In choosing to play an
October-through-March season (rather than a summer season, which the WNBA
played), the ABL played its games during the same months as the NBA, which was
the dominant force in the American professional basketball market.76 In addition,
the ABL seemed to opt for small venues, signaling sideshow, rather than marquee
status.77 The biggest reason, for the ABL’s fall, however, was the NBA’s support of
the WNBA. The ABL simply could not compete with the NBA’s brand.78
When the ABL folded, Chief Executive Officer Gary Cavalli explained that the
league was “unable to obtain the television exposure and sponsorship support
needed to make the league viable long term.”79 Cavalli asserted the ABL had talent
and prioritized its players, giving them healthy salaries and the option to buy
ownership stakes in the league, but that it was helpless against the WNBA’s NBAaided television exposure and sponsorship deals.80

74
Edelman & Harrison, supra note 17, at 8 (citing Valerie Lister, ABL Says No Bidding
War Despite McCray’s Jump, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 1997, at 10C).
75
Competition Forces ABL to File for Bankruptcy, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE J. (Dec. 23,
1998), http://lubbockonline.com/stories/122398/LS0439.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/
357T-DL52.
76
Id.
77
For instance, the league’s San Jose franchise, The Lasers, played the majority of its
games at the 4,600 seat San Jose Event Center on the San Jose State University campus and
only a few at the city’s 19,000 seat San Jose Arena (now named the SAP Arena at San Jose).
1996-1998 San Jose Lasers, FUN WHILE IT LASTED, http://www.funwhileitlasted.net/2013
/07/07/1996-1998-san-jose-lasers/, archived at http://perma.cc/63XT-S64J (last visited Oct.
28, 2014); History of the American Basketball League, THE ASS’N FOR PROF. BASKETBALL
RES., http://www.apbr.org/abl9699.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FH8E-K8MU (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015) (listing the San Jose Event Center and the San Jose Arena as home
arenas for the Lasers).
78
GRUNDY & SHACKELFORD, supra note 68, at 228–29 (commenting on the WNBA’s
higher profile because of its connection to the NBA).
79
Rob Gloster, American Basketball League Folds, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 22, 1998,
4:10 PM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1998/American-Basketball-League-Folds/id3578d5b373430211b933fd1bfa6d98e6, archived at http://perma.cc/6QYR-TPMX.
80
Notably, the ABL did have television deals with Fox Sports Net and Black
Entertainment Television; however, those deals were dwarfed by the WNBA’s deals with
NBC, ESPN, ESPN2, and Lifetime. Richard Sandomir, Too Few Dollars, No Real Exposure,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at D2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/23/sports/
pro-basketball-too-few-dollars-no-real-exposure.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U9XKDGZA; see also FRANK P. JOZSA, JR. & JOHN J. GUTHRIE, JR., RELOCATING TEAMS AND
EXPANDING LEAGUES IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: HOW THE MAJOR LEAGUES RESPOND TO
MARKET CONDITIONS 159 (1999) (citing the lack of national television rights as one of the
key factors resulting in the ABL’s demise). In addition, unsurprisingly, the WNBA’s
marketing budget far surpassed the ABL’s. In their first seasons, the WNBA and ABL had
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Indeed, as the ABL crumbled, ABL officials openly blamed the NBA,81 and the
allegations were sufficiently thorough that Connecticut’s Attorney General Richard
Blumenthal, who was distressed at the economic toll caused by the demise of the
ABL’s New England Blizzard franchise based in Hartford, Connecticut, launched
an investigation into whether the NBA was engaged in a “conspiracy to monopolize
women’s professional basketball.”82 Blumenthal believed there existed “evidence
that the N.B.A. used sharp economic elbows to exclude the A.B.L from fair play,
including access to essential financial rights and television and product
sponsorship,” and ultimately subpoenaed the NBA.83 The subpoena ordered the
NBA to provide documents, market studies, and any other material that discussed or
named the ABL as a competitor.84 In addition, it ordered the NBA to set forth “any
conditions or restrictions it imposes on broadcasters that carry any professional
basketball games of leagues other than the NBA or WNBA. . . . [and] any discussions
between the NBA or WNBA and corporate sponsors concerning an exclusive
arrangement that would preclude any deals with the ABL.”85
Although none of the information the NBA produced in response to the
subpoena indicated the NBA illegally prevented the ABL from securing any deals,
and no suits or charges were ever filed, it is impossible to ignore the NBA’s role in
the WNBA-ABL battle for survival.86 For the WNBA to win, it was not necessary
that the NBA actively thwart the ABL’s efforts. Being a part of the NBA and its
network of contacts and corporate partners was more than enough.87
Just as the WNBA was born of the NBA,88 the WNBA’s age eligibility rule was
born of the NBA. Indeed, “from [its] incipient stages . . . the WNBA . . . enforced
. . . league regulations to prevent [its] teams from drafting players that still had
NCAA college eligibility.”89 And in 1999, with the NBA owning each of the WNBA
teams and controlling all facets of the WNBA’s existence, the WNBA’s age

marketing budgets of $15 million and $1.5 million, respectively. See Barbara Huebner, In
Year 2, ABL Offers Real Alternative, League Will Reclaim Basketball Spotlight from WNBA,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 1997, at E7.
81
Lena Williams, N.B.A. Subpoenaed in A.B.L. Probe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at
D7.
82
Press Release, State of Conn. Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Issues
Subpoena to NBA in Probe of Alleged Conspiracy to Monopolize Women’s Basketball (Jan.
11, 1999), available at http://ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=1774&Q=282808, archived at
http://perma.cc/W84W-QTRB [hereinafter Press Release, Alleged Conspiracy].
83
Williams, supra note 82, at D7.
84
Id.
85
Press Release, Alleged Conspiracy, supra note 82.
86
Edelman & Harrison, supra note 17, at 6–7.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 6 (noting that “on April 24, 1996—almost seven months before the first ABL
game—the NBA announced that it, too, was launching a women’s professional basketball
league (the WNBA), which would begin play in the summer of 1997”).
89
Id. at 11.
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eligibility rule as it exists today became a part of the WNBA’s first collective
bargaining agreement.90
The WNBA took its first steps toward quasi independence from the NBA when,
in 2003, “the N.B.A. board of governors voted to change the W.N.B.A. business
model from a single-entity structure to individual team ownership.”91 By this time,
the league had grown from eight to sixteen teams, and the owners of NBA teams
located in cities with new WNBA teams were granted the right of first refusal to
purchase their sister teams.92 Four of the team owners—those in Miami, Orlando,
Portland, and Utah—declined the opportunity, opening the door for outside
ownership of WNBA teams.93 In the years since, the league has, in turn, contracted
and expanded, and now consists of twelve franchises: Atlanta Dream, Chicago Sky,
Connecticut Sun, Indiana Fever, New York Liberty, Washington Mystics, Los
Angeles Sparks, Minnesota Lynx, Phoenix Mercury, San Antonio Silver Stars,
Seattle Storm, and Tulsa Shock.94 Nine of these franchises (Atlanta, Chicago,
Indiana, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, Minnesota, Phoenix, and San
Antonio) share a city with an NBA team and six of them (Indiana, New York,
Washington, Minnesota, Phoenix, and San Antonio) are owned and operated by the
NBA team with which they share a city.95
Even the independently owned WNBA teams, though, are thickly intertwined
with the NBA. Indeed, at least fifteen NBA executives have supervisory roles with
respect to the WNBA,96 and the leagues work in tandem on everything from public
relations initiatives—such as diversity programs and the health and wellness

90

Id. at 11–12. Importantly, the WNBA’s age eligibility rule is not shielded from Title
VII scrutiny by being included in the CBA because “Title VII rights are independent rights
outside of the CBA . . . .” Miller v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1211 (N.D. Cal.
2013); see also Chopra v. Display Producers, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 714, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“[A] union cannot prospectively waive a member’s Title VII rights in a collective bargaining
situation.”) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974)).
91
Lena Williams, For Its Seventh Season, the W.N.B.A. Undergoes a Significant
Makeover, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2003, at SP2.
92
Mike Terry, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: WNBA Is Embarking on a New Era of
Individual Ownership After Six Years Under NBA’s Wing. Two Teams Have Folded, Two
Others Have Relocated, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at D3.
93
Id.
94
WNBA, http://www.wnba.com, archived at http://perma.cc/4MFA-534B (follow
“Teams” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
95
James Bowman, The WNBA and How Leagues Survive, SB NATION (Sept. 14, 2012,
1:51 PM), http://www.swishappeal.com/2012/9/14/3332960/the-wnba-and-how-leaguessurvive, archived at http://perma.cc/RZ9X-BDWA.
96
Compare Our Management Team, NBA, http://www.nba.com/careers/management_
team.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CFF2-8MZE (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) (listing
executives of the NBA and their job responsibilities, many which include responsibilities in
the WNBA), with League Directory, WNBA, http://www.wnba.com/about_us/blue_book.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/9BT9-AXLP (last visited Mar. 29, 2015) (listing executives
of the WNBA and showing that many executives hold the same position in both leagues).
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platform NBA FIT—to advertising and promotion campaigns.97 Perhaps most
tellingly, former NBA Commissioner David Stern, through the end of his tenure in
early 2014, continued to have tremendous authority over the WNBA. Indeed, when
WNBA President Donna Orender resigned in 2010, Stern was actively involved in
selecting her replacement, Laurel Ritchie, and Stern made the public announcement
of her hire.98 Nothing indicates that Adam Silver, who succeeded Stern as
Commissioner, is presiding any differently.
III. THE IMPACT OF INEQUITABLE AGE ELIGIBILITY THRESHOLDS
There is nothing subtle about the difference between the NBA’s age eligibility
rule and the WNBA’s age eligibility rule. There are no uncertain terms or buried
provisions that suggest trickery or sleight of hand. Rather, the difference is clear and
obviously intended: women must be three years older than men to play top-flight
professional basketball in the United States. This inequity is not merely an academic
matter. Rather, the female player is profoundly disadvantaged in real-world tangible
terms. As detailed below, the WNBA’s age eligibility rule subjects the female player
to an increased likelihood of injury during her college career and a decreased
likelihood of financially capitalizing on her athletic talent.
A. Risk of Injury
Injuries are a part of sport, as is the prospect of losing out on riches because of
them. However, when an athlete is capable of playing professionally, is prohibited
from doing so, and is injured during that period of prohibition, the prohibition
requires scrutiny.
In February of the 2012–2013 NCAA basketball season, Nerlens Noel, a
freshman center on the University of Kentucky’s men’s basketball team who was
projected to be the 2013 NBA Draft’s first pick suffered a gruesome tear of the
Anterior Cruciate Ligament (ACL) in his left knee.99 Initially, some pundits
questioned whether he would ever again be able to play at an elite level, and virtually
everyone analyzing the situation predicted that his draft stock would suffer.100 When
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See FIT, NBA, http://www.nba.com/nbafit/overview.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/W3YG-TQ8W (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
98
Laurel J. Richie Named WNBA President, WNBA (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://www.wnba.com/news/wnba_president_richie_110421.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/GA4C-BNXL. In 2013, the WNBA changed its logo. See supra note 67. The change,
however, was purely superficial, as it did not accompany any change in control or
organizational structure.
99
David Leon Moore, What Happens Now for Nerlens Noel, Kentucky After Unlucky
Twist?, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2013, at C1.
100
Id.
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the draft was held, four and a half months after the injury, Noel was picked sixth.101
While the sixth selection is an impressive draft position, it is almost certainly lower
than it would have been had Noel not injured his knee,102 and the lower draft position
correlates to less money. Under the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement, the
first pick in the 2013 draft receives $4,436,900 for his first NBA season, while the
sixth pick receives $2,643,600, and in the following season—which, like the first
season, is guaranteed under the rookie contract—the salary differential between the
first and sixth pick is roughly $2 million as well.103 So, with respect to the rookie
contract alone, the injury may have cost Noel almost $4 million.104

101
Benjamin Hoffman, U.N.L.V. Star Is No. 1, and Even He Is Surprised, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2013, at B16. Noel was so frustrated with his drop in the draft that upon being
drafted sixth by the New Orleans Pelicans and traded to the Philadelphia 76ers, he
proclaimed that he wanted to wear a number 5 jersey to acknowledge “the number of teams
that passed on him on draft day.” Michael Kaskey-Blomain, Nerlens Noel Wants His Jersey
Number to Acknowledge Teams That Passed on Him, PHILLY.COM (July 11, 2013, 12:48
PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/pattisonave/Nerlens-Noel-wants-to-wear-numberfive-in-honor-of-teams-that-passed-him.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8MWC-P8RC.
102
Some pundits attributed Noel’s lower draft position to character concerns about his
close associates, Eliot Shorr-Parks, Nerlens Noel’s ‘Bad Crowd’ Could Have Been Reason
He Fell to Sixers in Draft, According to Report, NJ.COM (July 1, 2013, 2:16 PM),
http://www.nj.com/sixers/index.ssf/2013/07/nerlens_noel_sixers_bad_crowd.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/8UJC-9K9A, but there is virtual unanimity the injury was the
predominant factor. Henry Abbott, Why So Many Teams Passed Up Nerlens Noel, ESPN
(June 28, 2013), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/60615/why-so-many-teamspassed-up-nerlens-noel, archived at http://perma.cc/488N-9SHK (“What’s wrong with
Noel? The best answer is creepy and just about impossible to get on the record. But it goes
like this: As a player with a known medical issue, Noel falls into one of the NBA’s most
damning cracks, between what’s good for teams and what’s good for general managers. In
short, Noel is the kind of player who can get a general manager fired, and most front offices
couldn’t stomach it.”); Kurt Helin, Injury, Risk Reasons Nerlens Noel Fell Down Draft
Board, NBC SPORTS (June 29, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/
06/29/injury-risk-reason-nerlens-noel-fell-down-draft-board/, archived at http://perma.cc/M
8JU-M3KB (“Then come draft night [Noel] fell all the way [to] No. 6, where he was taken
by New Orleans and promptly traded to Philadelphia. Nobody seemed to want Noel. What
was going on? Turns out the knee injury and the risk that comes with it did cause him to fall.
. . . Noel, coming off an ACL repair that was red flagged by a couple teams, was certainly a
risk.”).
103
NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, CBA 101: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2011 COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (NBA) AND
THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (NBPA) 29 (2012) [hereinafter
HIGHLIGHTS OF 2011 CBA], available at http://www.nba.com/media/CBA101_9.12.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/SL6H-RRNP.
104
Id. While some collegiate athletes participate in the NCAA’s Exceptional StudentAthlete Disability Insurance Program, which arranges loans for projected first round NBA
and NFL picks to secure $5 million dollar insurance policies in case of career-ending injuries,
Noel, whose injury was severely damaging but not career-ending, would not have qualified.
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In the wake of Noel’s injury, scores of sportswriters and fans criticized, as one
writer put it, “the NBA’s silly and unfair rule that players must be 19 and out of high
school a year before being drafted,” and they called for its elimination.105
Sportswriter Mike Lopresti of the USA Today, for instance, wrote:
The next time David Stern gets into a discussion about age limits for the
NBA, what will speak louder than Nerlens Noel’s scream? Nothing. It
might swing the debate. It should. It would be hard to argue otherwise, as
they wheeled Noel away [on the night of the injury], his knee wrecked,
his future as the probable 2013 No. 1 draft pick clouded. . . . The teenage
phenoms spend a season with college basketball because they have to,
hoping and praying not to take a wrong step. Please, don’t get hurt and
have everything change.106
Of course, NBA aspirants do not “have to” play a season of college basketball
under the NBA’s age eligibility rule, but virtually all of them do. Consistently
playing competitive basketball in some capacity is necessary to maintain one’s skill
level and the great bulk of NBA aspirants play in college rather than overseas or in

Zach Schonbrun, Injury Raises Questions About Insurance for College Stars, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2013, at B11. The NCAA has no insurance program to protect against injuries that
decrease an athlete’s value, and accessing such insurance through an outside provider is
extremely expensive. Id.
105
Reid Forgrave, Noel Feels “One-and-Done” Risk, FOX SPORTS (June 2, 2014, 3:05
PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/collegebasketball/story/kentuckys-nerlens-noel-other-starstake-all-the-risk-in-nba-one-and-done-rule-021313, archived at http://perma.cc/PNZ8WBG9; see also Cindy Boren, Nerlens Noel Injury Raises New Debate About NBA Age Limit
(updated), WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early
-lead/wp/2013/02/13/nerlens-noel-knee-injury-raises-new-debate-about-nba-age-require
ment, archived at http://perma.cc/KX4T-7TNL (describing the impact of the NBA’s age
requirement on Nerlens Noel’s NBA prospects); Rob Dauster, Nerlens Noel’s Knee Injury
and the Unfairness of the ‘One-and-Done’ Rule, NBC SPORTS (Feb. 13, 2013, 9:22 AM),
http://collegebasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/02/13/nerlens-noels-knee-injury-and-theunfairness-of-the-one-and-done-rule, archived at http://perma.cc/LC2X-ERU5 (bemoaning
the negative impact of forcing promising ball players to wait a year before entering the NBA
draft); Hughes, supra note 13 (discussing how the one-and-done rule is “unfair to players
who are not only physically ready to compete at the highest level, but who have nothing to
gain—and everything to lose—by attending college”).
106
Mike Lopresti, Nerlens Noel's Injury Brings NBA Age Limit Debate to Surface, USA
TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013, 10:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/lopresti
/2013/02/13/nerlens-noel-kentucky-nba-age-rule/1917697/, archived at http://perma.cc/CV
Q4-AHYN.
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some other forum,107 “hoping and praying,” as Lopresti writes, “not to take a wrong
step.”108
Similarly, WNBA aspirants almost all play collegiate basketball as they wait to
become WNBA eligible, but the burden they bear is far greater than that of the men.
Indeed, a female collegiate basketball player has to endure the risk of an injury such
as Noel’s for four times as long as Noel did. And if injured like Noel during her
freshman season (or during her sophomore or junior seasons), she will have to return
to college basketball and risk further injury rather than declare for the draft and
pursue rehabilitation without fear of additional injury on the amateur level.
The juxtaposition of Noel’s circumstance with those of two former star
University of Connecticut women’s collegiate basketball players, Caroline Doty and
Shea Ralph, illustrates the inequity. Both Doty and Ralph were, like Noel, highly
recruited starting players destined for professional stardom, and both, like Noel, tore
their ACLs as freshmen.109 The parallels, however, end there. While Noel’s injury
ended his collegiate career and he consequently declared for the Draft to be held
after his freshman year, the WNBA’s age eligibility rule prohibited Doty and Ralph
from doing so.

107
On rare occasion, a young athlete bucks the norm and plays basketball abroad rather
than at an American college or university. Brandon Jennings and Jeremy Tyler are two of
the most heralded players to have done so, and they have experienced two very different
outcomes:
In 2008, Brandon Jennings became the first American player to forego collegiate
basketball to play professional basketball in Europe. Jennings cited financial constraints as
his primary motivating factor for going abroad, but he likely would not have been able to
play collegiately in any case, as his standardized test scores were below the NCAA eligibility
threshold. Ultimately, he signed a one-year contract with the Italian club Lottomatica Roma
for $1.65 million. Jennings had a strong season in Europe, entered the 2009 NBA draft and
was selected tenth overall by the Milwaukee Bucks. He has become an elite NBA player.
See Chris Colston, Deals Add Drama to Draft Day, USA TODAY, June 26, 2009, at C1; Ray
Glier, In Europe, a Former High School Star Sends Home a Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2009, at D3.
In 2009, Jeremy Tyler left the United States after his high school junior year to play
professional basketball. After two years, during which he played in Israel and Japan, Tyler
was eligible for the 2011 NBA draft. See Christopher Johnson, N.B.A. Prospect Gets 2nd
Chance in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, at B14; Pete Thamel, Young, Talented and
Unsettled Playing Basketball Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, at SP1. He was selected
thirty-ninth overall by the Charlotte Bobcats, but his NBA career never blossomed, and he
currently plays in China. See Maggie Pilloton, Draymond Green on Trash Talk, Clippers,
Jeremy Tyler, Defense, and More, GOLDEN GATE SPORTS, (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://goldengatesports.com/2015/04/10/draymond-green-on-trash-talk-clippers-jeremytyler-defense-and-more/ archived at http://perma.cc/3YCR-4K2Y.
108
Lopresti, supra note 106.
109
Michelle Smith, UConn’s Ralph Guides Doty: Huskies Assistant Coach Helps
Guard Deal With Knee Injuries, ESPNW (Aug. 21, 2012, 5:04 PM),
http://espn.go.com/womens-college-basketball/story/_/id/8289064/espnw-uconn-carolinedoty-finds-kindred-spirit-shea-ralph, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3TE-QALY.
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After rehabilitation, with the WNBA off limits, Doty resumed her career at
Connecticut as the team’s starting point guard, but she tore her ACL again during
the summer before her senior season.110 Doty again rehabbed her knee, but she could
not regain her elite status, and after exhausting her collegiate eligibility in the spring
of 2013, professional basketball was not an option.111
Ralph, now an assistant coach for the University of Connecticut’s women’s
basketball team, suffered an astounding five ACL tears and subsequent
reconstructive surgeries during her collegiate career.112 She bounced back from her
first surgery, and then from her second, to play outstanding basketball, becoming
the Big East Player of the Year and an All-American.113 Eventually, however, as
Ralph played out her eligibility at Connecticut, her body broke down.114 She did not
recover as successfully from her third, fourth, and fifth surgeries, and although she
was ultimately drafted in the WNBA’s third round by the Utah Starzz, her injuries
prevented her from ever playing a WNBA game.115
Had these women been men, they would have been able to play professional
basketball in this country. They were denied the opportunity to enter the WNBA
after their freshman years because of their sex, and the subsequent injuries they
suffered in college ended their professional aspirations.
Because of sex and nothing else, a WNBA aspirant must spend four years,
rather than an NBA aspirant’s one, “hoping and praying,” as Lopresti writes, “not to
take a wrong step.”116 Doty’s and Ralph’s stories exemplify why this inconsistency
in eligibility rules is unfair and, ultimately, unlawful.

110

Id.
Id.
112
Id.
113
Shea Ralph, UCONN WOMEN’S BASKETBALL, http://www.uconnhuskies.com/
sports/w-baskbl/mtt/shea_ralph_389988.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6QCW-MTDW
(last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
114
See Smith, supra note 109.
115
Id.
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Lopresti, supra note 106.
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B. Compensation
Even assuming no injuries during the course of a female basketball player’s
collegiate career, the three additional years she is required to wait before entering
the WNBA can represent a loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars.
1. Domestic Playing Salary
WNBA salaries are relatively low for American professional athletes and they
are well below what NBA players make, but they are not insignificant. According to
the 2015 WNBA scale set forth in the WNBA CBA, a rookie makes between
$38,913 and $49,644 in the first season of her three-year guaranteed contract, with
the higher draft picks at the upper end of the range.117 In each successive season
under the contract, the pay increases, and in the third season she will make between
$41,677 and $55,701.118 While these figures may seem modest, it is important to
note that the WNBA season and post-season last for only six months, from May
through October. So, a highly drafted third-year player will earn the same amount
of money over the six month season as any person in any profession with an annual
salary of $111,402 earns over six months, which is roughly four times the average
American’s individual salary of $28,051.119 This is real money that the WNBA’s age
eligibility rule requires women, whose male age-mates are playing in the NBA, to
forgo.
Ultimately, over three years, while a woman such as Brittney Griner—who was
skilled enough to play in the WNBA after her freshman year of college and would
have indubitably been a high draft pick if allowed to enter the WNBA draft then—
is playing her sophomore, junior, and senior seasons of collegiate basketball, she is
losing out on over $150,000 in WNBA salary. When she does eventually enter the
WNBA after her senior collegiate season, she will be making roughly $13,000 less
as a rookie than she would be making as a fourth-year professional, and because
WNBA salaries increase to as much as $109,500 for fifth year players, in her second
and third WNBA seasons she will be making over $50,000 less per season than she
would have been able to make had she been permitted to enter the WNBA after her
freshman year.120
Sadly, WNBA careers, like most professional athletic careers are relatively
short. The average WNBA career spans only three-and-a-half seasons,121 most
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WNBA CBA, supra note 7, exhibit 5 (WNBA Rookie Scale), at 277.
Id.
119
State & County QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html, archived at http://perma.cc/96SL-B5M3
(last revised Dec. 3, 2013, 2:42 PM).
120
WNBA CBA, supra note 7, art. V § 8(a), at 34.
121
pilight (@over_short), Fanpost, Is There Enough Talent for WNBA Expansion?, SB
NATION SWISH APPEAL (June 10, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://www.swishappeal.com/2013/6/10/
118
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players are out of the league by age thirty, and only the rare, extraordinary player
lasts beyond age thirty-five. 122 By that age, the great majority of elite athletes have
lost the physical gifts that made them elite in the first place, and they can rarely still
compete at the top level. So the three-year prohibition that a WNBA aspirant endures
while her age-mate males play in the NBA amounts to three years of lost income, a
three year delay in the potential doubling of salary available to fifth year veterans,
and the associated time value of money benefits, but it also likely means—all other
things being equal—three fewer years to make money as a WNBA player.
2. International Playing Salary
Unfortunately for the women affected, forgoing a WNBA salary is only a small
portion of the economic loss they will suffer. Almost uniformly, WNBA players
play basketball overseas during the WNBA off-season, where they can earn
additional money.123 And generally, the overseas salaries far outstrip WNBA
salaries. Many players earn twice as much overseas as they earn playing in the
WNBA, and some earn four to five times as much.124 Indeed, because there are few
salary restrictions in other nations’ leagues, “[m]arquee players can make as much
[as] $600,000, including incentives . . . [and] two or three players can reach $1
million.”125 So, combining WNBA and international earnings, most female

4415758/is-there-enough-talent-for-wnba-expansion, archived at http://perma.cc/CT5J3KCN.
122
See, e.g., Kevin Pelton, A Question of Age, SEATTLE STORM (May 31, 2005),
http://www.wnba.com/storm/news/age050531.htmlhttp://www.wnba.com/storm/news/age0
50531.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QRS3-CSGB (offering a WNBA player age
comparison by team).
123
David Woods, Equal Pay? Not on the Basketball Court, USA TODAY (May 19,
2012, 10:57 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/story/2012-05-19/nbawnba-basketball-salary-disparity/55079608/1, archived at http://perma.cc/EHN7-P7DK.
124
Tom FitzGerald, Stanford’s Nneka Ogwumike Top Pick in WNBA, S.F. CHRON.
(Apr. 17, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/sports/article/Stanford-s-NnekaOgwumike-top-pick-in-WNBA-3486282.php, archived at http://perma.cc/K9EG-7QY4
(stating that WNBA players can earn four or five times as much overseas); Gene Phelps, For
Women’s Players, Europe Where Money Is, DAILY J. (July 22, 2007), http://www.wnba.com
/media/fever/070721_DJ_whitmorewhite1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E2RJ-WWMQ
(stating WNBA players can make four or five times as much overseas); L. Jon Wertheim,
The Big Score: The Dirty Little Secret of the WNBA Is That Many of Its Players Must Head
Overseas to Make Top Dollar, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 4, 2002), http://www.si.com/
vault/2002/11/04/332043/the-big-score-the-dirty-little-secret-of-the-wnba-is-that-many-ofits-players-must-head-overseas-to-make-top-dollar, archived at http://perma.cc/SKX2UBNK (stating WNBA players can double or triple their salaries if they play overseas).
125
Michele Steele, WNBA Players Cash In Overseas, ESPNW (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/espnw/news-commentary/article/7538075/wnba-players-cash-overseas,
archived at http://perma.cc/FV5K-6PDK.
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American professional basketball players earn six figures per year in salary, and
some earn seven figures per year.
3. Marketing and Endorsements
Salaries and incentives aside, WNBA players can command substantial sums
of money through marketing and endorsement deals. Because corporate entities tend
to seek out only the best and most popular players for such arrangements, not all
WNBA players have access to these opportunities. But for those players who do, the
economic rewards can be significant and can dwarf the money they make for actually
playing basketball. WNBA players endorse products of all sorts—from athletic
apparel to credit cards, including Nike, Adidas, Under Armour, Protégé Shoes,
Nfinity Athletic Corporation, Gatorade, Bazi All Natural Energy, Genesis Today,
Mazda, Dupont, and American Express.
Endorsement compensation figures are difficult to pinpoint, as they are rarely
publicly disclosed, but some players, such as the Los Angeles Sparks’ Candace
Parker and the Minnesota Lynx’s Maya Moore reportedly have had endorsement
deals worth between $3 million and $5 million respectively.126 Other players have
smaller five- and six-figure deals.127 But all players, once they become professionals,
have the potential to sign endorsement contracts; a potential that does not exist while
they are collegiate players.128
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Allison Glock, She’s the Total Package: Your Sister’s Pal, Your Brother’s Prom
Date, Supermom-to-be. She’s also an MVP-of a League Few Watch. So Can Candace Parker
Be the Female Jordan? Lots of Folks Are Banking on It., ESPN (July 10, 2012),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/magazine/archives/news/story?page=magazine-20090323article2, archived at http://perma.cc/Q9U5-YJWV; Moore Endorsement Deal Makes Jordan
Brand History, SPORTSPRO MEDIA (May 19, 2011), http://www.sportspromedia.com/news/
moore_endorsement_deal_makes_jordan_brand_history/, archived at http://perma.cc/63JTK4K.
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Kelli Anderson, The Trials of Diana Taurasi, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 12,
2011), http://www.si.com/vault/2011/09/12/106107597/the-trials-of-diana-taurasi, archived
at http://perma.cc/DR8-8WRZ (noting that with Taurasi’s “WNBA and off-season overseas
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Taken together, the money a female basketball player can make per year
through her WNBA salary, her international basketball salary, and her endorsement
deals can be impressive. And when that amount is multiplied by three—the number
of years a woman is barred from playing in the WNBA while her male age-mates
are permitted to play in the NBA—it can become staggering. Of course, not every
female basketball player who, if not for the WNBA’s age eligibility rule, would
choose to enter the WNBA after one year of a collegiate basketball could command
such money. Some might play in the WNBA and internationally but have no
endorsement deals. Others might play only in the WNBA at the league minimum
salary. Still others might prove insufficiently skilled to make a WNBA team, or they
might suffer career-ending injuries in training camp before playing a single
professional game. Whatever the outcome, each female basketball player one year
removed from high school, if not for the WNBA’s age eligibility rule, would have
the same opportunity as her male counterparts to make the best of a professional
basketball career. With the rule in place, she must wait three years to do what the
men are able to do immediately.
IV. PURPORTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE WNBA’S AGE ELIGIBILITY RULE
Notwithstanding this inequity and the criticism and controversy it has sparked,
the WNBA’s age eligibility rule has historically been justified on three principal
grounds:129 First, the rule helps portray female athletes as scholars (and therefore as
role models) and ensures that they are emotionally mature enough to handle both
playing competitive professional basketball and the off-court adulation and burdens
that accompany it. Second, the rule prepares its players for life after basketball
because WNBA salaries are not high enough to secure for its players financial
independence in retirement. Third, the rule strengthens women’s college basketball,

endorsement money for any sport, whether or not the endorsements are related to a sport the
athlete competes in at the college level.”).
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http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0102/11/se.01.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/GRB2-SNJ6; Tommy Craggs, Female Basketball Stars Hate Age Rules, Too, DEADSPIN
(June 17, 2009, 2:45 PM), http://deadspin.com/5294245/female-basketball-stars-hate-agerules-too, archived at http://perma.cc/3VHT-UTL7 (remarking that the WNBA’s defense of
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paternalistic); see Greg Bishop, Rutgers Basketball Star to Turn Pro in Europe, N.Y. TIMES
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which benefits the WNBA. While these aims may be laudable, none of them
reasonably justifies the rule. Each is addressed in turn.
A. The Scholar / Role Model Justification
It certainly is commendable that a professional sports league would want its
athletes to be scholars and role models, and it is arguable that requiring the athletes
be at least four years removed from high school will make it more likely they will
be considered as such. It is unclear, however, why it is more important for WNBA
players to be scholars and role models than it is for NBA players—who must be only
one year removed from high school—to be scholars and role models. Similarly, if a
four-year wait after high school will yield more physically and emotionally mature
WNBA players, then an analogous rule in the NBA would make sense. In sum, if
these rationales motivate the WNBA’s age eligibility rule, they should motivate the
same age eligibility rule in the NBA. The fact that they do not indicates these reasons
are pretextual or further indicia of the NBA’s facial and unlawful differentiation
between male and female professional basketball players.
Moreover, the dangers of relatively younger players entering professional
sports may be oversold. Like the WNBA’s age eligibility rule, the NBA’s rule
requiring that entrants be one year removed from high school has long been justified
on maturity grounds.130 The argument is simple: the older players are when they
enter the league, the more mature and responsible they are, and increased maturity
and responsibility leads to better personal decision-making.131 This, the argument
goes, benefits the player and the league, which seeks to hold its players out as
professional and personal successes.132
Professor Michael McCann, who has studied the NBA’s age eligibility rule and
the NBA’s defense of it, has, however, convincingly challenged the NBA’s premise
that its older players are more mature and responsible than its younger players. Using
criminal arrests as a metric, McCann contrasted the experiences of athletes who
entered the NBA immediately after graduating from high school with those who had
attended four years of college, and he found the former group—the “prep-to-pro”
players—made up a smaller proportion of the league’s arrested players.133
Specifically, he found that although players who spent four years in college
comprised 41% of the NBA’s players, they accounted for 57% of its arrested
players.134 In contrast, while players who did not attend college comprised 8% of the
NBA’s players, they accounted for only 5% of its arrested players.135 “Unbeknownst
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to most NBA fans and league observers,” McCann concluded, “prep-to-pro players
appear to be the best behaved group of . . . players in the NBA.”136
While no analogous study of WNBA players has been conducted, there is no
reason to believe that such a study would produce a different conclusion, and the
WNBA has offered no evidence to suggest younger entrants to the league are more
likely than older entrants to damage themselves or tarnish the league’s reputation.
B. Financial Security
Seeking to protect WNBA aspirants from abandoning a college or university
degree program for a relatively low-paying job as a basketball player, like seeking
to ensure WNBA aspirants are scholars and role models, is a noble aim. Such
protection is, however, overly broad and sexually discriminatory in its paternalism.
While the majority of WNBA aspirants will, as noted above, make far less
money per year as professionals than the majority of NBA players, some WNBA
aspirants stand to earn millions of dollars in salary and endorsements. The WNBA’s
age eligibility rule makes no distinction among WNBA aspirants who are likely to
earn millions and those likely to earn only tens of thousands. Instead the rule restricts
them all regardless of their circumstances or potential earning power. Moreover,
although NBA players make, on average, far more per year than WNBA players,
their financial outcomes are surprisingly dire. According to a Sports Illustrated
study, a substantial percentage of NBA players are bankrupt or otherwise financially
distressed within five years of retirement.137 If it is true that a four-year collegiate
playing experience improves financial outcomes, it would appear the NBA should
adopt an age eligibility rule requiring its entrants be four years removed from high
school. If, however, NBA aspirants are permitted to take their financial chances and
turn professional after one year of college, the same should be the case for WNBA
aspirants. That it is not the case suggests the continued resonance of paternalistic
perspectives that have long hampered women athletes in American sport.
Such paternalistic perspectives have historically centered, for the most part, on
physical exertion. Examples abound across the sporting landscape and throughout
the world. For instance, beginning in 1921 and for over fifty years thereafter,
“England’s Football Association banned women from playing soccer on Football
League grounds because the game was deemed ‘quite unsuitable for females and
ought not to be encouraged.’”138 More recently, after a 1964 military coup, Brazil’s
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National Council of Sports (CND), with the approval of the dictatorship, banned
women from playing soccer, Brazil’s national game, for over twenty years.139
Distance running was also long considered too strenuous for women. Women
were excluded from Olympic track and field entirely until 1924, and although
various events were opened to women over the course of the following years and
decades, women were not permitted to participate in the Olympic marathon until
1984.140 And even then, other Olympic sports remained off limits to women. Most
notable among these were ski jumping and Nordic combined (a combination of ski
jumping and cross country skiing). The resistance to permitting women to compete
in these events came from the very top and was unabashed. Indeed, in 2005, the
President of the International Ski Federation, Gian Franco Kasper, justified
excluding women from the events because “it’s like jumping down from, let’s say,
about two meters on the ground about a thousand times a year, which seems not to
be appropriate for ladies from a medical point of view.”141 Kasper did not identify
any medical research to support his position.142 Despite a robust movement to secure
inclusion of women’s ski jumping and Nordic combined in the 2010 games, women
ski jumpers and women Nordic combined athletes found themselves on the outside
looking in.143
This paternalistic sense, which has long hampered women’s athletic ambitions,
may well be at play—consciously or perhaps subconsciously—in the rationale
supporting the WNBA’s age eligibility rule. Whatever the case, a woman should be
no more restricted from making a financially risky professional decision as a college
student than she should be from “jumping down from . . . two meters on the ground
about a thousand times a year.”144 If men are permitted to attempt it, there is no
reason that women should not be.
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C. Strengthening the Women’s Game
Former NBA Commissioner David Stern, former WNBA President Val
Ackerman, and former NCAA President Myles Brand have all touted age eligibility
requirements in professional basketball as being beneficial to college basketball.
In 2001, when CNN correspondent Wolf Blitzer asked then-WNBA President
Val Ackerman about the WNBA’s age eligibility rule, Ackerman defended it, noting
“it’s enabled the women’s college game to stay very vibrant, and that’s critical to us
as [a] league. We need a strong college game in order for women’s pro basketball to
be successful.”145 Five years later, Ackerman, Stern, and Brand, along with other
leaders in amateur and professional basketball, met at the NCAA’s headquarters in
Indianapolis, Indiana to address “areas of common interest,”146 and a number of
potential action items emerged from the meeting and follow up talks took place in
subsequent months.147 Among the potential action items was an increase in the
NBA’s age eligibility threshold from one year removed from high school to two
years removed from high school.148
Ultimately, the NBA made no change, but Stern and Brand’s collaboration on
the rough outlines of such a proposal created the same concern that Ackerman’s
comments to Blitzer, years earlier, created. It is certainly true that the NBA and
WNBA age eligibility rules benefit college basketball—allowing teams to build
legacies and encouraging strong, committed fan bases—and they may well also
benefit the NBA and WNBA. Nevertheless, this suggestion of a mutually beneficial
relationship seems to ignore completely the interests of the athletes themselves and
raises the antitrust and collusion concerns that Harrison, Edelman, and others have
explored.149
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Potential antitrust violations aside, notwithstanding the justifications for the
WNBA’s age eligibility rule, the rule may be legally vulnerable, because it creates
and perpetuates gender inequity, which is precisely what Title VII’s prohibition on
sex discrimination was designed to eliminate.
V. THE NBA’S LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WNBA’S AGE ELIGIBILITY RULE
Although, as noted above, the WNBA has evolved since its founding, it remains
an NBA subsidiary,150 and while parent corporations are generally not liable for their
subsidiaries’ discriminatory acts,151 there exist several exceptions to this rule, two of
which—the integrated enterprise doctrine and the direct participation liability
doctrine—suggest the NBA would be legally responsible for any Title VII-triggering
sex discrimination flowing from the WNBA’s age eligibility rule.
This section of the article explores these two doctrines as applied to the NBAWNBA relationship, assuming the WNBA’s age eligibility rule does in fact trigger
Title VII, and Part VI, which follows, tests that assumption.
A. Integrated Enterprise Doctrine
When a parent exhibits substantial control over a subsidiary, as the NBA does
with respect to the WNBA, that parent can be held liable for the subsidiary’s
unlawful acts under the “integrated enterprise doctrine.”
The integrated enterprise doctrine was born in the labor context. In 1965 in
deciding Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast
Service of Mobile, Inc.,152 the United States Supreme Court developed a four-part
test to determine when separate entities constituted an “integrated enterprise” for
purposes of establishing National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction.153 The Court
found an integrated enterprise exists when the following four characteristics are in
place: (1) interrelations of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3)
common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control.154 In the
years that followed, as federal courts began to explore parent-corporation liability in
the Title VII context, they borrowed Broadcast Service of Mobile’s test for
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determining whether separate organizations can be viewed as one for purposes of
Title VII analysis.155
While each of these factors is important, the second—centralized control of
labor relations—has developed primary importance and ultimately drives the
inquiry.156 If the parent company exhibits centralized control of the subsidiary’s
labor relations, it is vulnerable to Title VII liability for its subsidiary’s act. If the
parent company does not exhibit such control, liability is unlikely.
Because the second factor has become the most important of the integrated
enterprise test’s four factors, it has also become the most debated, with various
circuits supporting different interpretations.
The Fifth Circuit applies a strict test in determining whether centralized control
of labor relations exists, requiring that for such control to exist, the parent must
control the subsidiary’s day-to-day employment decisions or have “some nexus to
the subsidiary’s daily employment decisions.”157 Under this view, which the Tenth
Circuit shares, parent-corporation liability for a subsidiary’s alleged discriminatory
acts rests on the question, “what entity made the final decisions regarding
employment matters relating to the person claiming discrimination.”158
Although neither the Fourth Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit has explicitly
adopted the integrated enterprise test in assessing Title VII actions, district courts in
both circuits appear to rely on the test and apply it essentially as the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits do.159
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The Sixth Circuit, which like the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, has explicitly
adopted the integrated enterprise test, has taken a far more flexible view toward what
constitutes “centralized control of labor operations.”160 It found that for a parent
corporation to be liable under Title VII, the parent must have “participation [that] is
sufficient and necessary to the total employment process, even absent total control
or ultimate authority over hiring decisions.”161 The Second Circuit, in the 1995 case
of Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc.,162 opted for the Sixth Circuit’s more flexible
approach over the Fifth Circuit’s strict approach, and the First Circuit has since done
the same.163
The Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have each gone their own way on the
issue, taking unique positions that do not conform fully to either the Fifth or Sixth
Circuit approaches and that could reasonably be construed as falling somewhere
between the two.164
Under the integrated enterprise doctrine, the likelihood of success for a Title
VII sex discrimination challenge based on the WNBA’s age eligibility rule,
therefore, would rest largely on the location of the suit.165 Although a plaintiff would
be hard-pressed to show that the NBA controls the WNBA’s “day-to-day
employment decision[s],”166 a plaintiff’s chances of success would be higher under
the more forgiving approach taken in the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits.167
Because the NBA and WNBA are both based in New York City, it is likely that any
such challenge would be filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York and, if appealed, would end up before the Second Circuit.
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A challenge to the age eligibility rule on gender grounds, therefore, would rest
largely on the extent to which the NBA is intertwined with, and directs, WNBA
policy-making. And under such a standard, the presiding court may deem the NBA
and WNBA an integrated enterprise for purposes of considering the sex
discrimination claim. As noted above, when the NBA founded the WNBA and the
WNBA’s age eligibility rule took effect, the NBA’s dominance over the WNBA was
obvious in the latter’s finances and its very existence.168 And since then, the NBA
and WNBA have continued to operate as an integrated enterprise—sharing corporate
offices and executives, and collaborating in marketing, community service, and
other initiatives.169
B. Direct Participation Liability Doctrine
The direct participation liability doctrine presents another theory under which
the NBA may be found liable for the WNBA’s acts. Direct participation liability
exists when a parent company’s direct participation in a subsidiary’s affairs creates
the conditions producing the challenged conduct.170 In particular, under the direct
participation liability doctrine, “a parent corporation may be held liable if ‘there is
sufficient evidence to show that the parent corporation directed or authorized the
manner in which an activity is undertaken.’”171
Courts have examined various factors in determining whether direct
participation liability exists, but the “key” elements are “a parent’s specific direction
or authorization of the manner in which an activity is undertaken and foreseeability
of injury.”172 Thus, “if a parent company specifically directs a subsidiary activity,
where injury is foreseeable . . . the parent could be held liable.”173
Cima v. WellPoint Health Networks, Inc.174 is illustrative. In Cima, the
plaintiffs were customers of an insurance company called RightCHOICE, which was
acquired by WellPoint, making RightCHOICE a WellPoint subsidiary.175 The
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plaintiffs theorized that WellPoint acquired RightCHOICE “for the purpose of
causing the latter to withdraw from the Illinois insurance market, thereby forcing
RightCHOICE insureds to convert to more expensive policies issued through . . .
Illinois subsidiaries of WellPoint.”176 Moreover, they alleged that the withdrawal of
RightCHOICE from the market constituted a breach of their policies’ renewability
provisions and that WellPoint should be liable for the breach because it was a “de
facto party to the plaintiffs’ policies with RightCHOICE under the . . . ‘directparticipant’ doctrine.”177
Although the facts of Cima are dissimilar from the NBA context in that they do
not involve Title VII, the Cima court’s application of the direct participation liability
doctrine is not at all fact dependent. The court articulates the doctrine as follows:
a corporation may be held liable for the acts of affiliates if an alleged
wrong can be traced to that corporation ‘through the conduit of its own
personnel and management’ and the corporation exerted control over
affiliates ‘in a way that surpasses the control exercised by a parent as an
incident of ownership.’178
And the court goes on to explain that “‘[t]he key elements’ in imposing liability on
a corporation under the direct participant doctrine are the corporation’s ‘specific
direction or authorization of the manner in which an activity is undertaken and
foreseeability.’”179
In short, the Cima court found the test for direct participation liability “focuses
on the degree to which a corporation used its ownership interest in another
corporation to ‘command rather than merely cajole’ the latter.”180 Under the Cima
court’s application of the direct participation liability doctrine, the NBA could
certainly be deemed liable for the sex discrimination flowing from the WNBA’s age
eligibility rule.
The court in Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc.181 took the same view of the direct
participation liability doctrine, and indeed, seemed to inspire the Cima court’s
perspective. In Forsyth, the wives of two men who died in an oil refinery fire at
Clark Refining sued Clark USA, which was Clark Refining’s only shareholder, for
wrongful death, alleging budget cuts instituted by Clark USA made the refinery less
safe.182 Clark USA defended on the grounds that it was merely a holding company,
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but the court was not persuaded, finding that “if a parent company specifically
directs an activity, where injury is foreseeable, that parent could be held liable.”183
While there is no way to predict the particular factors a court will look to in
applying the direct participation liability doctrine, if the court focuses on the “key”
specific direction and foreseeable injury elements, it is likely the NBA would be
found to have “direct participation” in the WNBA’s affairs.
Even assuming the NBA is deemed responsible for the WNBA’s age eligibility
rule under the integrated enterprise doctrine or the direct participation liability
doctrine, it is necessary to determine whether that rule actually triggers Title VII
liability.
VI. POTENTIAL TITLE VII LIABILITY
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Congress passed “to implement
[America’s] national commitment to equality,”184 is widely considered to be “the
most far-reaching bill on civil rights in modern American history.”185 In total, the
Act has eleven titles,186 prohibiting discrimination of various sorts, but Title VII—
which prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations from
discrimination with respect to personnel decisions—“has emerged as having the
most significant impact in helping to shape the legal and policy discourse on the
meaning of equality.”187
While Title VII has wide berth, it is not a general civility law. It has limitations,
chief among which is that it applies to only a particular subset of covered entities:
employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations.188 Assuming, as argued
in Part V, that the NBA is deemed responsible for the WNBA’s age eligibility rule’s
effects, the NBA would be subject to Title VII liability if the NBA were deemed to
be a covered entity and if disparate treatment analysis were to reveal a Title VII
violation.
A. Is the NBA a Covered Entity under Title VII?
There are two ways the NBA could be subject to Title VII: as an employer or
as an employment agency.

183

Id. at 237.
Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection
of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB & EMP. L.J. 431, 432
(2005).
185
Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Phillip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and the
March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
186
See Belton, supra note 184, at 432.
187
See id. at 432–33.
188
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (c) (2006).
184

596

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

1. The NBA as an ‘Employer’
Title VII defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .”189
And it defines a “person” as “one or more . . . partnerships, associations [or]
corporations . . . . ”190
The NBA is a corporation with operations throughout the nation and the world,
and it lists sixty-eight people on its website as being a part of the NBA “Management
Team.”191 The NBA is, therefore, unquestionably an employer under Title VII and
is bound by section 703(a) of the statute, which reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.192
Notably, the NBA’s individual clubs, not the NBA itself, employ the league’s
players, but under the doctrine of third-party liability, the NBA may still be liable
under section 703(a) of Title VII for the sex discrimination of its clubs. While Title
VII applies primarily to the relationships between individuals and employers, third
parties often “control . . . an individual’s access to employment or the terms of his
employment with another employer.”193 Under such circumstances, many courts
have found that the third party, in addition to or as opposed to the direct employer,
is potentially liable for any discrimination that transpires.194
Such a reading makes sense under the statute as third parties can control
employment opportunities just as direct employers do. And, indeed, the two
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categories of entities enumerated in the statute other than employers—employment
agencies and labor organizations—are essentially third parties.195 As Andrew O.
Schiff writes in The Liability of Third Parties Under Title VII:
Congress’s inclusion of employment agencies and labor organizations
demonstrates its awareness of the damage that third parties can cause
through discrimination. Since it has before it both a party—a covered
employer—to which Title VII refers, and an activity—discriminatory
exercise of control over employment relationships with other
employers—that Title VII prohibits, a court does not reach very far by
forbidding a covered employer that has a relationship with an individual
similar to that of an employment agency or labor organization from
discriminating in a manner prohibited to those institutions. . . . Reading
Title VII to prohibit the discriminatory activities of third parties helps
effect Congress’s purpose of eliminating discrimination from the job
market and the work place.196
Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Commission197 is instructive. In that case,
a harness horse driver-trainer, Puntolillo, brought Title VII national origin
employment discrimination charges against the New Hampshire Racing
Commission (NHRC), which regulates horse racing in New Hampshire, and the
New Hampshire Trotting and Breeding Association (TBA), which conducts horse
races in New Hampshire.198 Puntolillo alleged that in 1971 and 1972 the NHRC and
the TBA “unlawfully interfered with his employment opportunities by
discriminating against him because of his Italian national origin.”199 The defendants
moved to dismiss Puntolillo’s action, arguing that owners of the horses Puntolillo
trained, not the NHRC or the TBA, were his employers.200 They noted the horse
owners hire, fire, and pay the trainers, and neither the NHRC nor the TBA conducts
any of these traditional employment activities.201 Puntolillo did not argue otherwise,
but he insisted that the NHRC and the TBA were involved in determining whether
he could work,202 and the court agreed.203
The court found the NHRC and the TBA exercised control over the ability of a
driver-trainer to earn a living, which created a third-party employment relationship
with the driver-trainer.204 In particular, the court explained the TBA controlled and
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assigned horse stalls at the racetrack, and the NHRC issued licenses to participate in
the races, and both a stall space and a license are necessary to work as a drivertrainer, whoever the particular owner may be.205
Ultimately, despite recognizing that “the [employment] relationship here is not
the traditional one,”206 the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that:
[t]o permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly
affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an
individual’s employment opportunities with another employer, while it
could not do so with respect to employment in its own service, would be
to condone continued use of the very criteria for employment that
Congress has prohibited.207
The facts of the Puntolillo case are strikingly analogous to the NBA context.
Just as the horse owners in Puntolillo employ the rider-trainers, the NBA and
WNBA clubs employ the players. And just as the TBA and the NHRC control,
through stall and license allocation, whether driver-trainers will have the opportunity
to work for a horse owner, the NBA controls, through its age eligibility rules,
whether a player will have an opportunity to work for a team. Puntolillo successfully
defeated defendants’ argument that because they were not Puntolillo’s direct
employers they could not be held liable for their discrimination,208 and plaintiffs
challenging the WNBA’s age eligibility rule would likely similarly defeat an NBA
defense based on not being a direct employer.
Such a liberal reading of Title VII is not unorthodox. Courts have generally
recognized that, as a piece of remedial legislation, Title VII should be read
liberally,209 and the Puntolillo court followed that time-honored practice. In deciding
as it did, the court wrote:
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[Title VII] is aimed at providing equal employment opportunities. Its
purpose is to ‘achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past’ in a discriminatory fashion. . . .
The courts have consistently recognized that ‘Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 should not be construed narrowly.’210
It is, therefore, reasonable that the NBA be deemed a third party employer with
respect to WNBA players, and as such, it should be prohibited from engaging in the
unlawful employment practices set forth in section 703(a) of Title VII, above.
Indeed, subsection (2) of 703(a) describes precisely what the NBA, through the
WNBA’s age eligibility rule, does: it serves to “classify . . . applicants for
employment in [a] way which would deprive or tend to deprive [an] individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [her] status as an employee,
because of such individual’s . . . sex.”211
By classifying men as eligible for the NBA one year removed from high school
and classifying women as eligible for the WNBA four years removed from high
school, the NBA deprives scores of women the opportunity to gain employment as
professional basketball players in the United States for no other reason than their
sex. Such classification is unlawful under Title VII and should be eliminated.
2. The NBA as an ‘Employment Agency’
If, for some reason, the NBA is not deemed an employer under Title VII, it
should certainly be deemed an employment agency. The statute defines an
employment agency as “any person regularly undertaking with or without
compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees
opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person.”212
Procuring employees for employers is a core part of the NBA’s mission. For
the NBA to exist, its teams must have players, and the NBA works steadfastly to
ensure that happens. It hosts combine events at which NBA aspirants audition for
NBA clubs,213 it conducts a lottery to determine the order in which clubs will select
players in the NBA draft,214 it conducts the actual draft during which clubs select the
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players who will likely become their employees,215 and it hosts post-draft summer
leagues in which recently drafted players, undrafted players, and other free agents
compete against each other in front of potential employers.216 Moreover, the NBA
creates and enforces the rules that determine how an NBA team can acquire players
already in the league, whether by way of a trade or free agency.217 The NBA has all
the trappings of an employment agency and could be easily construed as one by a
court. With respect to employment agencies, Title VII states,
it shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . to fail or refuse to refer
for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify
or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.218
In procuring players for clubs, the NBA draws clear eligibility distinctions
based on sex. It “refuse[s] to refer for employment” women who are fewer than four
years out of high school while referring for employment similarly situated men.219
In doing so, the NBA unlawfully discriminates against these women.
B. Title VII’s Disparate Treatment Analysis
If a court determines the NBA is an entity covered under Title VII, the disparate
treatment discrimination inquiry will follow. Generally, Under Title VII disparate
treatment analysis, a plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination,
which usually involves showing: she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) applied
for or was otherwise available for a position, (3) was qualified for the position, and
(4) was rejected under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.220 A prima facie case can also be made, however, through a showing
of direct evidence of discrimination.221 In contemporary times, direct evidence
usually proves hard to come by because bias is often covert or even subconscious,
resulting in no “smoking-gun proof” of discrimination.222 With respect to the
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WNBA’s age eligibility rule, however, direct evidence exists in the form of the rule
itself as read in conjunction with the NBA’s age eligibility rule. Men are held to one
standard and women are held to another. Thus, assuming a court determines that the
NBA can be held responsible for its subsidiary’s age eligibility rule by way of the
integrated enterprise test or direct participation liability theory, a plaintiff who was
barred from entering the WNBA because of the WNBA’s age eligibility rule would
have no problem making out a prima facie case.
Once a prima facie case is made, the defendant normally has the option of either
(1) denying that it discriminated and arguing that the plaintiff was barred for a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason223 or (2) admitting that it discriminated and
justifying its discrimination under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
doctrine.224 In this case, the NBA would not be able to avail itself of the former
option, because the discriminatory distinction is clear. Rather, it would have to turn
to the BFOQ doctrine to shelter its discriminatory rule.
The BFOQ doctrine serves as a limited exception to Title VII’s general
prohibition on employment discrimination. While the BFOQ doctrine does not apply
in cases of race-based and color-based discrimination, it does permit an employer to
discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin if the discriminatory
requirement is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business or enterprise.”225
For instance, the WNBA’s requirement that all players in the league be female
would almost certainly trigger the BFOQ exception. The WNBA was created
specifically for female basketball players, and including males would, by definition,
fundamentally transform the league. A male plaintiff might challenge the all-female
rule, claiming that being a woman is not a BFOQ of playing basketball in the
WNBA, but he would almost surely lose. Although courts construe the BFOQ
doctrine narrowly, it has been found in some cases to justify discrimination when an
employer is concerned about privacy, authenticity, or safety.226 Courts have
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repeatedly found that men can be prohibited for safety reasons from participating in
women’s contact sports,227 and it is difficult to imagine such a defense failing with
respect to the WNBA gender restriction.
With respect to the WNBA’s age eligibility rule, however, it is difficult to
imagine the defense succeeding. In order to prevail under the BFOQ exception, the
NBA would have to show that being fewer than four years removed from high school
would adversely affect a woman basketball player’s ability to do her job228 and that
the requirement that women basketball players be at least four years removed from
high school relates “to the central mission of the employer’s business.”229 There are
certainly no privacy or authenticity interests in requiring women be four years
removed from high school before entering the WNBA. And while the WNBA could
perhaps argue that young women must be several years removed from high school
to safely compete with older and in some cases stronger WNBA veterans, without
evidence that this safety concern is greater for WNBA aspirants than for NBA
aspirants the argument would fall flat.
VII. CONCLUSION
From the beginning, the WNBA—which was born of the NBA’s approval in
the NBA’s cities with NBA teams’ colors and largely NBA-related names and which
survived a challenge from the ABL by virtue of its NBA affiliation—has featured a
more stringent age eligibility rule than the NBA. When taken together, the two rules
create two different tracks—one for men and one for women—to be negotiated on
route to a professional basketball career in the United States. This sort of dualtracking, in which one route presents advantages over the other, is unacceptable in
a nation committed to gender equity, and it therefore requires Title VII scrutiny.
Although parent companies often are not held liable for their subsidiaries’ acts,
both the integrated enterprise doctrine and the direct liability participation doctrine

227

See Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 172–74 (3d Cir. 1993);
see also Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, 738–39 (R.I. 1992) (As
“boys and girls are not similarly situated as they enter athletic competition . . . the
classifications are based on the realization that distinguishing between boys and girls in
interscholastic sports will help promote safety . . . .”); B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., Cumberland
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059, 1067–70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (affirming the
Commissioner of Education’s conclusion that the petitioner’s son could not play on the high
school girls’ field hockey team for safety reasons).
228
1 SUSAN M. OMILIAN, SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 13:2, 13-2021 (2013) (“In essence, the Court said, the BFOQ defense is available if the sex of the
employee affects that worker’s ability to do the job.”); see also Int’l Union, UAW, 499 U.S.
at 201 (“By modifying ‘qualification’ with ‘occupational,’ Congress narrowed the term to
qualifications that affect an employee’s ability to do the job.”).
229
Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 203 (“[I]n order to qualify as a BFOQ, a job qualification
must relate to the . . . ‘central mission of the employer’s business.’”) (citing W. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985)).

2015]

HOOP DREAMS DEFERRED

603

suggest the NBA could be held liable for the discrimination that flows from the
divergent policies. And, therefore, whether the NBA is determined under Title VII
analysis to be a third party employer or an employment agency, an aggrieved woman
basketball player who is ruled ineligible under the WNBA’s age eligibility rule but
who would be eligible, were she a man, under the NBA’s age eligibility rule, will
have a potentially viable claim. As such, the NBA and WNBA would do well to
revise their age eligibility policies such that men and women of the same age have
the same access to employment in the NBA and WNBA, respectively.

